Criminal sanctions under state and federal antitrust laws by Flynn, John J.
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS UNDER STATE AND 
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Perhaps the most violently debated issue in the law of antitrust 
remedies is whether criminal sanctions should be imposed. Some have 
made impassioned pleas for a crusade against criminal sanctions as abet­
tors of “communism”;1 others have complained that private business 
interests in the United States regularly violate the antitrust laws with 
the impunity of hardened criminals.2 Although several studies have 
considered the desirability of criminal antitrust sanctions,3 certain myths 
and presumptions have often prevented an intelligent examination of 
the use of criminal sanctions in this field. This article will first examine 
the history and use of state and federal criminal antitrust sanctions; it 
then will discuss the myths and presumptions that have grown up 
around this most controversial of antitrust remedies and will suggest 
an appropriate role for criminal sanctions in the enforcement of federal 
and state antitrust laws.
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f  Associate Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Utah. B.S., 1958, Boston 
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1 Cahill, M u st W e B rand A m erican Business by In d ic tm en t as Criminals?, 1 ABA A n t i ­
t r u s t  S e c t io n  26 (1952). See also Hazard, A re B ig  Businessm en Crooks?, A t l a n t i c  M o n t h ­
l y ,  Nov. 1961, at 57.
2 See generally  E. S u t h e r l a n d ,  W h i t e  C o l l a r  C r im e  (1949). See also Kennedy, T h e  
A n titru s t A im s o f th e  Justice D epartm ent, 9 N.Y.L.F. 1, 3 (1963), where the former At­
torney General categorizes clear-cut antitrust violations as “economic racketeering."
3 E.g., A t t ’y  G e n . N a t ’l  C o m m . A n t i t r u s t  R e p .  343-93  (1955); P .  H a d l i c k ,  C r i m i n a l  
P r o s e c u t io n s  U n d e r  t h e  S h e r m a n  A n t i t r u s t  A c t  (1939); W .  H a m i l t o n  & I .  T i l l ,  A n t i ­
t r u s t  i n  A c t i o n  (TNEC Monograph No. 16, 1941); A n titru s t A dm in istra tion  and Enforce­
m e n t and th e  A tto rn ey  General’s C om m ittee R ep o rt: A  B rie f Sym posium , SO N w . U X .  
R e v .  305 (1955); Berge, Some P roblem s in the  E nforcem ent o f the  A n titru s t Laws, 38 
M ic h .  L .  R e v .  462 (1940); Carman, Analysis o f C hapter V III, A n titru s t A dm in istra tion  
and E nforcem ent, 7  ABA A n t i t r u s t  S e c t io n  148 (1966); Chadwell, A n titru s t A dm in istra ­
tion  and E nforcem ent, 53 M ic h .  L . R e v .  1133 (1955); Hazard, supra note 1; Kadish, Some
Observations on the  TJse o f C rim inal Sanctions in E nforcing E conom ic Regulations, 30 
U . C h i .  L .  R e v .  423 (1963); Rashid, W h a t is R ig h t W ith  A n titru s t, 5 A n t i t r u s t  B u l l .
5 (1960); S p iv a c k , T h e  System o f E nforcem ent: T h e  U nited States, in C o m p a r a t iv e  A sp e c ts  
o f  A n t i - T r u s t  L a w s  in  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  t h e  U n i t e d  K in g d o m  a n d  t h e  E u r o p e a n  E c o ­
n o m ic  C o m m u n i ty  4 0  (Int’l & C o m p . L .Q . S u p p .  P u b .  N o .  6 , 1963); Whiting, Crim inal A n ti­
trust L ia b ility  o f Corporate R epresentatives, 21 A B A  A n t i t r u s t  S e c t io n  327 (1962); 
Comment, C rim inal Prosecutions fo r  V iolations o f the  Sherm an A ct: I n  Search o f a Policy, 
48 G e o . L.J. 5 30  (1960); Note, C rim inal Prosecutions U nder th e  Sherm an A n titru s t A ct, 13 
G e o . W a s h .  L . R e v .  4 3 4  (1945); Note, Increasing C om m unity  Control Over Corporate Crime 
— A  Problem  in  the  L aw  o f Sanctions, 71 Y a l e  L.J. 28 0  (1961).
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I .  E a r l y  H is t o r y  o f  C r im in a l  A n t it r u s t  Sa n c t io n s
The use of criminal sanctions to deter that kind of antisocial 
conduct now known as antitrust violations is not a recent legal develop­
ment.4 In  the fifth century the Emporer Zeno issued an edict to the 
Praetorian Prefect- of • Constantinople that forbade monopolization, 
price fixing, - and illegal contracts on penalty of perpetual exile or a 
fine of forty pounds of gold.5 In  Moslem law the hoarding of provisions 
to increase their prices was a, most heinous offense.6 And in  civil law 
jurisdictions certain types of antitrust violations are punishable by crim­
inal-sanctions.7 .
T he common law as well has long favored freedom of competition 
and opposed restraints of trade and monopoly.8 From time to time 
criminal statutes were promulgated to deter and penalize activities 
that now would be antitrust violations, particularly in  emergencies or 
when predatory practices were threatening the necessities for human
. 4 For a full discussion of the historical basis for antitrust policy see State v. Central 
Lumber Co., 24 SJD. 136,123 N.W. 504 (1909); Dewey, T h e  Comm on-Low Background of 
A n titru s t Policy, 41 V a . L. R e v .  759 (1955). .
_ 5 To insure strict enforcement, this edict assessed a fipe of fifty pounds of gold against 
the tribunal charged :with its enforcement “if it should happen that either through 
venality, dissimulation, or some other vice, the provisions of Our most salutary constitu­
tion with reference to prohibited monopolies and forbidden agreements of corporates 
bodies should not be executed.” C o d e  4.59.1, translated in 13 S.P. S c o t t ,  T h e  C iv i l  Law 
120. (1932); see Note, Comm ercial T rusts o f R o m e , 23 A m . L. R e v .  261 (1889).
6 The Hedaya declared: "[W]hosoever keepeth. back grain forty days in order to 
increase its price, is at variance with God, and God is at variance with him." The 
Hedaya IV, XLIV, VI, cited in  13 S .P . S c o t t ,  supra  note 5, at 121 n.l.
7 See, e.g., C o d ig o  P e n a l  d e  E s p a n a  arts. 556-57; C o d ig o  P e n a l  P o r t u g u e z  1I, IX, I. 
For discussions of present-day European antitrust regulations see C o m p a r a t iv e  A s p e c ts  o f  
R e s t r i c t i v e  T r a d e  P r a c t i c e s  (Inti & Comp. L.Q. Supp. P u b .  No. 2, 1961) (the law of 
the European Economic Community, France, West Germany, Italy, and Switzerland); 
R e s t r i c t i v e  P r a c t i c e s ,  P a t e n t s ,  T r a d e  M a r k s  a n d  U n f a i r  C o m p e t i t i o n  i n  t h e  C o m m o n  
M a r k e t  (Int’l  & Comp. L.Q. Supp. P u b .  No. 4, 1962) (the law of Germany and the 
Netherlands); Venturini, M onopolies and R estrictive T rade  Practices in Ita ly , 13 I n t ’l  & 
C o m p . L.Q. 617 (1964).
. 8 See generally A . C u r t i s ,  T r u s t s  a n d  E c o n o m ic  C o n t r o l  116 (1931); T . J e n k s  & 
W. C l a r k ,  T h e  T r u s t  P r o b le m  209-14 (5th ed. 1929); W. H. T a f t ,  T h e  A n t i - T r u s t  A c t  
a n d  t h e  S u p re m e  C o u r t  6-21 (1914); Dewey, supra  note 4; Holdsworth, Industria l Com­
binations and th e  Law  in th e  E igh teen th  C entury, 18 M in n .  L. R e v .  369 (1934); Jones, 
H istorical D eve lopm en t■ o f th e  Law  o f Business C om petition  (pts. 1-4), 35 Y a l e  L.J. 905 
(1926),. 36 Y a l e  L.J. 42, 207, 351 (1926-27). Contra, I n  re Greene, 52 F. 104 (SJD. Ohio 
1892) (citing no authority). Coke, in discussing an early English statute against “Monopo­
lists, Propounders and Projectors," 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1623), once stated that “all giants of 
monopolies are against the ancient and fundamental laws of this kingdom.” E. C o k e , 
T h i r d  I n s t i t u t e  cap. 85, at 181 (4th ed. 1669). A d a m  Smith also spoke out strongly against 
engrossing, forestalling, and the other anticompetitive practices of his day. A. S m ith ,  
T h e  W e a l t h  o f  N a t i o n s  499-501 (Modem library ed. 1937). Few cases seem to have 
been brought, and the policy against conspiracies in restraint of trade seems to have 
resulted in criminal prosecutions against labor organizations primarily. See Dewey, supra  
note 4, at 766-71. The only known instance where businessmen were criminally prose­
cuted for a conspiracy in restraint of trade at common law is found in The King v. 
Norris, 2 Keny. 300, 96 Eng. Rep. 1189 (K.B. 1758). Consequently, the question whether 
conspiracies in restraint of trade were indictable common law offenses seems never to 
have been settled. See Dewey, supra  note 4, at 771.
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existence.9 This common law antimonopolistic policy was instilled in 
the character of the early American colonists. Indeed, the Boston Tea  
Party was provoked in part by the granting of a royal monopoly to 
the East India T ea Company. W ith the advent of independence and 
the task of settling the remainder of the continent, antimonopoly fervor 
declined.10
T he closing of the frontier, the settlement of the states’-rights 
conflict by the Civil War, and the explosion of the Industrial Revolu­
tion rekindled antimonopoly fervor in the second half of the nineteenth 
century.11 A  new impetus for antitrust legislation arose from among 
agrarian and labor interests.12 T he embattled farmer believed he was 
the victim of a massive conspiracy of monopolists and participation in  
a trust “should be a crime subject to severe punishment.”13 T he leader 
of the powerful Knights of Labor summed up the workingman’s 
attitude against trusts by saying: “He is a true Knight of Labor who 
with one hand clutches anarchy by the throat, and with the other 
strangles monopoly.”14 In 1888 all major political parties included 
antimonopoly planks in their party platforms.15 This popular reaction 
to the business excesses of the Industrial Revolution compelled both 
the states and the federal government to take strong legislative action 
against restraints of trade and monopolies. Given the long history of 
legal and economic opposition to restraints of trade and the popular 
agitation against the abuses of nineteenth-century laissez-faire capital­
ism, it is not surprising that state and federal legislatures expressed the 
people’s revulsion against antitrust violators by adopting criminal 
statutes.
II. T h e  U s e  o f  C r i m i n a l  Sa n c t io n s
Following the lead of earlier state legislation,16 the Sherman Act17 
adopted criminal sanctions as a principal enforcement weapon for
a See, e.g., Judicium  Pillorie, 51 H en. 3, c. 6 (1266); Statutum de Pistoribus, 51 Hen.
3, c. 1 (1266); O rdinatio Stapularum, 27 Edw. 3, c. 2 (1353) (the Ordinance of the Staples 
penalized forestalled w ith “pain  of life and members”); An Acte Againste Regratours 
Forestallers and Engrossers, 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 14 (1552), repealed, 12 Geo. 3, c. 71 (1772); 
T he King v. W addington, 1 East 143, 102 Eng. Rep. 56 (K.B. 1801) (a criminal case 
imposing a  heavy fine for engrossing).
10 Most industry was small, and political interest became centered in  the slavery issue. 
H . T h o r e l l i ,  T h e  F e d e r a l  A n t i t r u s t  P o l ic y  55 (1954).
IX Id . a t 55-57.
12 id .  a t 143.
13 W . S. M o rg a n , H i s to r y  o f  t h e  W h e e l  a n d  A l l i a n c e ,  a n d  t h e  Im pend ing  R e v o lu ­
t i o n  15-17 (1889), quoted in  H . T h o r e l l i ,  supra note 10, at 144.
14 T .  P o w d e r ly ,  T h i r t y  Y e a rs  o f  L a b o r , 1859-1889, a t 546 (1889), quoted in H . 
T h o r e l l i ,  supra note 10, a t 148. '
15 H . T h o r e l l i ,  supra  note 10, a t 150-51.
16 See H . S e a g e r  & C . G u l ic k , T r u s t  a n d  C o r p o r a t io n  P ro b le m s  341-43 (1929).
17 Sherman A ntitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 15 (1964).
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federal antitrust legislation.18 Although fines and jail sentences were 
thought to be the key federal19 and state20 antitrust remedies, the actual 
use of criminal sanctions does not reflect the criminal character of the 
statutes. For example, of the 1,499 antitrust cases instituted by the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice between 1890 and 
1959, only 729 were brought as criminal actions.21 Although the Sher­
man Act was intended to be essentially a criminal statute,22 actual 
enforcement practice has acknowledged that its equitable remedies, 
which can be used to enjoin prohibited conduct and restructure or 
otherwise correct noncompetitive markets, are equally valuable. Con­
versely, it can be argued that even though the actual use of federal 
antitrust remedies has failed to reflect the essentially criminal nature 
of the Sherman Act, the primary remedy of the statute has been and 
remains the criminal sanction with equitable relief being sought solely 
to prevent future violations. Experience in enforcing the Act, however, 
has exposed several defects in this theory.
18 p .  H a d l ic k , supra note 3, a t 12, 22. Senator Sherman did not seem to favor the inclu­
sion of criminal sanctions ia  the antitrust law. See 21 C ong . R e c . 2604 (1890) (remarks of 
Senator Sherman). T he fervor against trusts and monopolists was so strong in  Congress, 
however, that the final version of the Sherman Act passed both  Houses w ith only one 
dissenting vote. P. H a d lic k , supra note 3, a t 21. For analysis of the history and passage 
of federal antitrust legislation see W . H a m i l to n  & I. T i l l ,  supra note 3; H . T h o r e l l i ,  
supra note 10; Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. C h i. 
L . R e v . 221 (1956). For discussion of th e  practical factors involved in  a criminal antitrust 
case see Cecil, Fines and Imprisonment, in ABA A n t i t r u s t  H a n d b o o k  519 (1958); Cox, 
The Criminal A ntitrust Case—Indictm ent Through Trial, in  1963 N e w  Y o rk  S t a t e  B a r  
Ass’n , A n t i t r u s t  L a w  Sym posium  96 (CCH T rade Reg. Rep.); Marden, From Subpoena 
to Indictm ent in Criminal Antitrust Cases, in  1963 N e w  Y o rk  S t a t e  B a r  Ass’n , A n t i ­
t r u s t  L a w  Sym posium  76 (CCH Trade Reg. Rep.); Reycraft, Criminal A ntitrust Proceed­
ings, in 1963 N e w  Y o rk  S t a t e  B a r  Ass’n , A n t i t r u s t  L a w  Sym posium  64 (CCH T rade Reg. 
Rep.).
19 P. H adlick, supra note 3, a t  22. T he legislative history of the Sherman Act is 
practically nonexistent, since “the bill which was arduously debated was never passed, 
and . . . the bill which was passed was never really discussed.” W. H am ilton  & I. T i l l ,  
supra note 3, a t 11. However, i t  seems fair to say th a t given the tem per of the debates, 
congressional concern with predatory practices, and the departure from the common law 
approach of treating such questions as a m atter of private law rather than public law, 
Congress believed criminal prosecutions would be the prim ary remedies for violations 
of the Act. Section 4 of the Sherman Act authorizes the Attorney General to institute 
equitable proceedings, and § 6 authorizes property forfeitures. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 6 (1964). 
T he Wilson Tariff Act provides for fines from §100 to $5000, three- to twelve-month ja il 
sentences, injunctions, and property forfeitures for restraints of foreign trade. 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 8-12 (1964). T h e  Clayton Act provides for private treble damage actions. 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1964).
20 p . H a d lic k , supra note 3, at 22. Most pre-Sherman Act state antitrust laws were 
cast in  the form of criminal statutes. In  addition to criminal sanctions, state remedies for 
antitrust violations include injunctions, property forfeiture, charter and license revoca­
tion, voiding contractual arrangements, and damages. See App. B, infra, for a  state-by- 
state outline of remedies available under state antitrust laws. •
21 App. A, Table I, infra. Many of these cases involved several defendants, and many 
were companion civil and criminal cases. . , ■
22 See note 19 supra. , ' ' ' .
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A . Jail Sentences
(1) T he Federal Experience
Of the 729 criminal antitrust cases brought by federal enforcement 
officials from 1890 to 1959, only 486 cases have been pursued to the 
stage of imposing a sanction.23 Of these 486 criminal cases pursued to 
remedy, only 48 resulted in the imposition of jail sentences,24 and in 
most of these cases the sentence was suspended and the individuals 
were placed on probation.25 During the first fifty years of the Sherman 
Act (to 1940), the twenty-four cases resulting in jail sentences com­
prised thirteen cases where jail sentences were imposed on businessmen 
and eleven in which sentences were imposed on labor leaders.26 From 
1940 to 1961 jail sentences ranging from thirty to ninety days each were 
imposed on twenty businessmen.27 W ith the notable exception of the 
electrical equipment conspiracy cases in 1961, jail sentences have been 
imposed primarily in cases of economic racketeering28 or upon the 
officers and agents of small, closely held corporations or small trade as­
sociations.29 These statistics suggest that the smaller the corporate 
defendant, the easier it is to impose criminal sanctions upon those 
responsible for the corporation’s antitrust violation.30 In fact, attempts 
to impose criminal penalties upon the managers of large corporations 
have usually proved fruitless, particularly when the individuals and 
the corporation were tried together. Even though it is logically incon-
23 App. A, T able X, infra. 154 of the criminal cases were dismissed or otherwise 
disposed of, and 81 cases were nol-prossed by the Government. Id .
24 Id.
25 F o r  ex am p le , o f  62 sen tences im p o sed  fro m  1950 to  1959, o n ly  12 w ere  to  b e  served. 
See D e p ’t  o f Ju s tic e  C ase Nos. 1055, 1062, 1063, 1070, 1113, 1158, 1173, 1192, 1247, 1263, 
1429, 1447, 1454, 1461, 1462, 1478, T h e  F e d e r a l  A n t i t r u s t  L a w s w i th  S u m m ary  o f  C ases 
I n s t i t u t e d  b y  t h e  U.S. 1890-1951 (CCH 1952), id., 1952-1956 S u p p le m e n t (CCH 1957), 
supplemented in N e w  U.S. A n t i t r u s t  C ases (CCH T ra d e  R e g . R e p . T ra n s fe r  B in d e r  
1957-1961) and 5 T r a d e  R eg . R e p . «I«I 45,003-59 (1957). _
so Note, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate Crime—A Problem in the 
Law o f Sanctions, 71 Y a le  L.J. 280, 291 (1961).
27 id . T he cases through 1938 are collected in P. H ad lick , supra note 3, a t 139-77, 
through 1946 in S ta f f  o f  M o nopo ly  Subcomm., H ouse S e le c t  Comm, on S m a ll  Business, 
7 9 th  Cong., 2d Sess., U n ited  S ta te s  Versus Econom ic C o n c e n tra tio n  and  M o nopo ly  
257 (Staff P rin t 1946). For statistical analyses see W hiting, Antitrust and the Corporate 
Executive, 47 Va. L. Rev. 927, 984-87 (1961); App. A, infra.
28 U nited States v. Shapiro, 103 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1939), United States v. Buchalter,
88 F.2d 625 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 301 U.S. 708 (1937).
29 E.g., Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass’n  v . U nited States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.
1954); U nited States v . McDonough Co., 1959 T rade Cas. 69,482 (S.D. Ohio). T his trend 
in enforcement policy has been criticized as “ the most serious objection” to federal 
criminal enforcement policy since “it discriminates against the officers of small com­
panies.” Comment, supra note 3, a t 540.
30 Watkins, Electrical Equipm ent Antitrust Cases— Their Implications for Govern­
m ent and for Business, 29 U. Chi. L . Rev. 97 (1961); Comment, supra note 3, a t 540; Note, 
supra note 26, at 302-03. . • . ■
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sistent to convict the corporation and exonerate those who control 
the corporation or act on its behalf, individual defendants and juries 
have often shifted the responsibility for a violation to the corporation.31 
Thus the first seven decades of Sherman Act enforcement have seen 
relatively little use of jail sentences in ordinary antitrust cases. By 
and large, jail sentences have been meted out only to labor leaders in 
the early twentieth century and more recently in  the case of flagrant 
antitrust violations82— they are a seldom-requested and seldom-imposed 
sanction for antitrust violations. Consequently, while legislative history, 
statutory construction, and the total number of criminal cases brought 
under the Sherman Act may indicate that the Act is essentially a 
criminal statute, the actual number of antitrust defendants sent to 
jail for Sherman Act violations suggests that the Sherman Act is 
something less than essentially a criminal statute in practice.
(2) T he State Experience
T he majority of state antitrust statutes provide for the imposition 
of a jail sentence for violation of the law.33 In several states, the possible 
prison sentence for an antitrust violation far exceeds that of a prison 
sentence under federal law 34 However, just as federal antitrust cases 
have demonstrated a reluctance by federal enforcement officials to 
request prison sentences and a reluctance by federal courts to impose 
them, what state enforcement there has been indicates a similar trend. 
T he lack of state enforcement in general35 makes any survey difficult.
31 See, e.g., U nited States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 411 (7th Cir. 1941); 
United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1929). In  the past these 
results seem to have discouraged the Justice Departm ent from indicting corporate officers 
when it indicted the corporation. T he future may find this situation altered. See notes 
112-13 infra and accompanying text.
32 Recent examples of the la tter class of cases are U nited States v. Brookman Co., 229 
F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Cal. 1964); U nited States v. McDonough, 1959 Trade Cas. 69,482 
(S.D. Ohio); and the so-called Electrical Equipm ent Conspiracy Cases, Dep’t  of Justice 
Cas. Nos. 1496a, 1498, 1500, 1502, 1504, 1506, 1507, 1517, 1519, 1521, 1523, 1525, 1527, 1529, 
1539, 1541, 1548, 1550, 1558, and 1566. N e w  U.S. A n t i t r u s t  C ases (CCH T rade Reg. Rep. 
Transfer B inder 1961).
33 Thirty-five states provide for prison sentences of varying lengths for various 
types of antitrust violations. See App. B, Remedies Available U nder State A ntitrust Laws, 
infra.
3* E.g., F l a .  S t a t .  A nn. § 542.05 (1962) (one to  te n  years f o r  a  v io la tio n , w ith  each  
d ay  o f  v io la tio n  a  se p a ra te  offense); G a . C ode A nn. § 26-5008 (S upp . 1966) (u p  to  tw en ty  
years fo r  re s tra in ts  o f  tra d e ); L a .  R e v . S t a t .  A nn. §§ 51.122-23, 51.126 (1965) (u p  to  th re e  
years fo r  illeg a l r e s tra in ts  o f  tra d e , m o n o p o lies , o r  m ergers).
35 See N e w  Y o rk  S t a t e  B a r  Ass’n , R e p o r t  o f  t h e  S p e c ia l C om m , t o  S tu d y  t h e  
N e w  Y o rk  A n t i t r u s t  L aw s, a t 89a-116a (1957), where the replies to a questionnaire sent 
to each state attorney general indicate very few states have any program of antitrust en­
forcement. A  similar survey by the au thor in  1963 indicates little change in the overall 
record. Replies to questionnaires on file, Legislative Research Center, University of 
Michigan Law School. T he  failure to enforce state antitrust laws has been attributed to
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There are, however, few reported incidents of violations of state 
antitrust statutes punished by jail sentences, and there is little to 
indicate that many unreported instances of the use of this remedy 
by the states exist.
Only four old reported cases have been found in which sentences 
were imposed for violations of a state antitrust statute,36 and in one of 
them the statute was not in terms an antitrust statute, though the 
conduct penalized was of an antitrust character.37 T he few remaining 
reported cases of prison sentences related to antitrust violations in­
volved jail sentences for refusal to comply with court orders for the 
production of evidence in an antitrust investigation38 or for violation 
of an injunction issued because of an antitrust violation.39
T he paucity of litigated cases and statistics concerning state use 
of criminal sanctions makes any general conclusions unreliable. Never­
theless, one general inference regarding state antitrust" criminal sanc­
tions may logically be made: In some instances the failure to enforce 
state antitrust statutes may be attributable in part to the general harsh­
ness of the sanctions.
B . C rim inal Fines
(1) Federal Experience with Criminal Fines
Violation of the major federal antitrust statutes may result in the 
imposition of a fine of up to 50,000 dollars for each violation.40 Re­
luctance to request and impose jail sentences for antitrust violations 
has caused the vast majority of federal antitrust criminal prosecutions 
pursued to remedy to result in the imposition of a fine.41 Moreover, 
since most of the cases in which a jail sentence was imposed at all
severa l fac to rs . See J . F ly n n ,  F e d e ra lism  a n d  S t a t e  A n t i t r u s t  R e g u la t io n  90-96 (1964); 
A rn o ld  & F o rd , Uniform State Antitrust Act: Toward Creation of a National A ntitrust 
Policy, 15 W . R e s. L.- R e v . 102, 107-08 (1963); R a h l,  Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust 
Policy, 39 T e x a s  L. R e v . 753 (1961); S te m , A Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law: 
T ex t and Commentary on a D raft Statute, 39 T e x a s  L. R e v . 717 (1961).
36Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904); Lemmon v. State, 77 Ohio St. 427, 83 
N.E. 608 (1908); Amsman v. State, 11 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 113, 20 Ohio C. Dec. 445 (Lucas 
County Cir. Ct. 1908); State v. Hygeia Ice Co., 4 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 361 (Lucas County C.P. 
1906).
37 Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904).
38 E.g., In  re Bell, 69 Kan. 855, 76 Pac. 1129 (1904); State v. Jack, 69 Kan. 387, 76 
Pac. 911 (1904), aff'd, 199 U.S. 372 (1905); State v. Smiley, 65 Kan. 240, 69 Pac. 199 (1902), 
aff’d, 196 U.S. 447 (1905).
30 E.g., E x parte Henry, 147 Tex. 315, 215 S.W.2d 588 (1948).
40 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
41 In  90% of the crim inal cases brought by the federal government from 1890 to 1959, 
the sole remedy imposed upon the individuals o r corporations involved was a criminal 
fine; ja il sentences or suspended sentences w ith probation were the sole remedies in  only 
1% of the cases. App. A, T able I, infra.
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involved labor leaders42 or antitrust violations amounting to eco­
nomic racketeering,43 the ordinary business violator has, with rare 
exception,44 been penalized with only a criminal fine.
Even in the assessment of criminal fines the federal courts have 
tended to be more lenient than the extent of the illegal injury and 
profits as alleged in the indictment would demand.45 And although 
the dollar has become gradually devalued in the face of inflation over 
the past six or seven decades, the amount of the fine assessed per case 
and per individual has remained relatively constant and relatively 
low.46
In assessing the amount of the fine in a federal criminal antitrust 
case, the court may impose a separate fine for violations of separate 
sections of the antitrust laws, as well as separate fines for a conspiracy 
to violate, an attempt to violate, and the actual violation of the anti­
trust laws.47 Thus, the amount of the federal antitrust fine could far 
exceed 50,000 dollars, since one factual pattern may reveal several 
indictable offenses. As a general rule, however, there have been few 
instances of multiple fines based upon the same factual situation.
Various factors are taken into consideration by federal courts in  
assessing the amount of the fine. Thus, the presence or absence of 
intent to violate the law and the degree of willfulness; the amount of
42 E.g., Gulf Coast Shrimpers & Oystprman’s Ass’n v. U nited States, 236 F.2d 658 
(5th Cir.), cert, denied, 352 U.S. 927 (1956).
43 E.g., U nited States v. Shapiro, 103 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1939); United States v. 
Buchalter, 88 F.2d 625 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 301 U.S. 708 (1937).
44 E.g., United States v. T renton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. 
McDonough Co., 1959 Trade Cas. 69,482 (S.D. Ohio). Perhaps the most famous series 
o£ cases in  which businessmen have been given ja il sentences are the so-called Electrical 
Equipm ent Conspiracy Cases, cited supra note 32. Summaries o£ the allegations, pleas, 
and dispositions o£ these cases may be found in  N e w  U.S. A n t i t r u s t  Cases, supra  note 32.
45 For ex am p le , in  th e  E le c trica l E q u ip m e n t C o nsp iracy  Cases, c ite d  supra n o te  32, 
tw en ty -n in e  c o rp o ra tio n s  a n d  fo rty -£our in d iv id u a ls  w ere  in d ic te d  fo r  b id  r ig g in g  a n d  
p ric e  fix ing . All d e fe n d a n ts  u lt im a te ly  p le a d e d  g u il ty  o r  n o lo  c o n ten d e re  a n d  w ere  fined  
a  to ta l  o f  a p p ro x im a te ly  $2,000,000. T he h ig h es t in d iv id u a l fine w as $12,500. T he v a lu e  
o f  th e  goods in v o lv ed  exceeded o n e  b il l io n  dollars. See also Beatrice Foods Co. v. United 
States, 312 F.2d 29 (8 th  C ir.), cert, denied, 373 U.S. 904 (1963); P re s id e n t’s C om m ’n  o n  
L a w  E n fo r c e m e n t  a n d  A d m in is t r a t io n  o f  J u s t ic e ,  T a s k  F o rc e  R e p o r t ,  C rim e  a n d  I t s  
Im p a c t—A n  A ssessm ent 112 (1967).
46 During the 1950-1960 period of federal antitrust enforcement, fines ranged from 
$10 in United States v. Inland Coca Cola Bottling Co., Crim. 3450 (D. Idaho, Sept. 16,
1954) (Dep’t of Justice Case No. 1206) to §187,500 in  U nited States v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
20 F.R.D. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1957) (Dep’t of Justice Case No. 1264). Of the 256 corporate 
executives who had fines assessed against them during this period, the average fine was 
slightly over $2,100. For a detailed survey of average fines levied in  cases brought between 
1955 and 1965 see J . C l a b a u l t  & J. B u r to n ,  S h e rm a n  A c t  I n d ic tm e n ts  1955-1965: A 
L e g a l  a n d  E co n o m ic  A n a ly s is  103-12 (1966). Some states have better luck. See, e.g., 
Moody, Texas Antitrust Laws and Their Enforcement w ith Some Reference to Federal 
Antitrust Laws, 9 A BA  A n t i t r u s t  S e c tio n  100, 126-35 (1956).
47 American Tobacco Co. v. U nited States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); U nited States v. 
Kansas City Star Co., 1955 T rade Cas. 68,117 (W.D. Mo.).
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illegal benefits accruing to the accused; the degree to which the indi­
vidual violators are responsible for the violation; the effectiveness of 
companion civil cases in ending the violation; Government recom­
mendations on the amount of the fine; the willingness of a defendant 
to settle private treble damage suits, waive appeals, and plead nolo 
contendere; and the cost to the Government in uncovering and prose­
cuting the violation may all be considered to varying degrees by an 
individual court in assessing the amount of the fine.48
T he use of criminal fines as an antitrust remedy has largely been a 
pragmatic process at the federal level. T he prosecutor decides on a prag­
matic basis which cases should be brought criminally, and the federal 
judges have used practical factors in assessing the amount of the fine. 
If anything, however, the fines have been low in relation to the 
gravity of the offense, perhaps indicating that federal courts value the 
fine as a deterrent device and not as a means for disgorging illegal 
gain. T he 1955 amendment to the Sherman Act raising the maximum  
fine from 5,000 to 50,000 dollars49 was based on a theory that the 
criminal fine should serve both as a deterrent and to some degree as 
a remedial device to recover illegal profits.50
The criminal fine is, of course, the only criminal sanction that 
can be imposed on a corporation as a corporation. In view of the 
disparity between the amount of the fine and the amount realized 
by corporate antitrust violators in many cases,51 the chief value of the 
criminal fine against a corporation seems to lie in its branding a con­
victed corporation a criminal.52 W hile this label does not normally 
affect a corporation in a tangible monetary way, unless of course it 
might influence the granting or retention of a government franchise, 
contract, or other governmental largesse, it does reflect upon the cor­
poration's image. Since goodwill is an important property right of a 
corporation,63 a criminal conviction for corporate violation of antitrust
48 See, e.g., United States v . Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, 1960 T rade Cas. ^  69,596 (NJD. 
Ind.), afj’d, 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961); United States v. McDonough Co., 1959 Trade 
Cas. 69,482 (S.D. Ohio); United States v. Association of Am. Battery Mfrs., 1954 Trade 
Cas. U 67,753 (W.D. Mo.); United States v. Minneapolis Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 1953 
T rade Cas. 67,622 (D. Minn.).
49 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). T he  Attorney General’s Committee had recommended tha t 
the fine be raised from §5,000 to $10,000. A t t ’y G en . N a t ’l  C om m . A n t i t r u s t  R e p . 352 
(1955); see Carman, supra note 3.
50 See Hearings on S. 996, S. 2252-55, Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and M onop­
oly of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962).
51 See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
52Kadish, supra note 3, a t 434.
53 See generally B . W r ig h t ,  T h e  N a t u r e  a n d  B asis o f  G o o d w il l  (1929); Ju  M e i Y ang, 
G o o d w il l  I n ta n g ib le s  (1927); Foreman, “Conflicting Theories of Goodwill," 22 C o lu m . L. 
R e v . 638 (1922).
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policy may have a deterrent value.54 T he extent to which this is true 
depends upon how well-known the conviction becomes55 and upon 
the public’s reaction to the violation. This latter factor, of course, may 
rest in turn on the degree of moral turpitude the public attaches to an 
antitrust violation, a factor psychologists have yet to measure.
In summary, therefore, the criminal antitrust fine is the most 
common device used to ;deter and punish antitrust violations; in most 
cases the amount of the fine does not approximate the amount of illegal 
gain; the criminal antitrust fine is the only criminal sanction for de­
terring and punishing a corporate violator; and the chief deterrent 
value of the criminal antitrust fine lies in its branding the corporate 
antitrust violator a criminal in detraction from business goodwill.66
' ' (2) State Experience with Criminal Fines
State antitrust laws have long been characterized by their reliance 
upon criminal fines and civil forfeitures to enforce compliance with 
antitrust policy. Thirty-eight states provide criminal fines for a gamut 
of antitrust violations.57 However, any attempt to evaluate the use of 
criminal fines in state antitrust enforcement meets the same difficulties 
that prevented a comprehensive evaluation of' jail sentences as an en­
forcement device. Evidence of actual enforcement is slight, and those 
cases where state antitrust laws have been enforced by criminal fines 
are usually of pre-World War I vintage.58 Consequently, little mean­
ingful decisional law concerning criminal antitrust enforcement at the
54 See W . F rie d m a n , L a w  in  a  C h a n g in g  S o c ie ty  196 (1959); G . W il l ia m s , C r im in a l  
L aw : T h e  G e n e r a l  P a r t  863-64 (2d ed. 1961). B u t see Note, supra note 26, a t 287 n.35.
55 Some writers have charged that-an titrust violations do no t generally become well 
known because of a reluctance or "conspiracy of silence on the part of the press” to 
publish antitrust prosecutions. See, e.g., E. S u th e r la n d ,  supra note 2; cf. text accompany­
ing notes 96-97 infra. T he  notoriety of a “big” criminal antitrust case seems to serve the 
salutary purpose of causing self-regulation. See W hiting, Antitrust and the Corporate 
Executive, 48 V a . L. R e v . 1, 3 (1962).
58 T he primary value of criminal antitrust sanctions is their deterrent effect upon 
individual businessmen. See note 59 infra. Since courts seldom imprison individual 
violators and the sanction of a fine seldom corresponds w ith the am ount of illegal gain, 
the chief deterrent in a criminal sanction seems to be the stigma that attaches upon in ­
dictment and conviction for a  criminal offense.
57 See App. B, infra.
G8 E.g., Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1908); Sanford v. People,
121 111. App. 619 (1905); Chicago, W ilmington & Vermillion Coal Co. v. People, 114 111. 
App. 75, aff’d, 214 111. 421, 73 N.E. 770 (1905). Before the Kentucky antitrust law was 
dedared unconstitutionally vague in  International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 
216 (1914), the county attorneys o f  Kentucky were establishing a  record for fines by 
prosecuting the International Harvester Company for antitrust violations in  each county. 
Examples are International Harvester Co. v. Commonwealth, 137 Ky. 668, 126 S.W. 352 
(1910); Commonwealth v. International Harvester Co., 131 Ky. 551, 115 S.W. 703 (1909). 
T he State of Texas seems to have had the greatest success w ith criminal fines. From 
1912 to 1924, §1,538,250 in fines were levied under the Texas antitrust laws.
HeinOnline -- 45 Tex, L. Rev, 1310 1966-1967
1967] CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 1311
state level has developed. For example, many state antitrust laws ex­
pressly penalize corporate officers acting in a representative capacity,59 
but several have never been interpreted by the courts.
Another reason that the states impose criminal fines even less 
often than they resort to the other antitrust sanctions at their disposal 
is the availability of monetary civil forfeitures.60 Usually a per diem  
monetary amount for each day of violation, the civil forfeiture (sup­
posedly civil in nature) has the advantages of avoiding the stigma of 
criminality,61 of substituting the procedure and standards of proof used 
in civil proceedings for the stricter standards of procedure and proof 
utilized in criminal proceedings,62 and of allowing the state to appeal.63 
But most states use even civil forfeitures only rarely. T he general 
failure to enforce state antitrust laws, again, provides little empirical 
support for an analysis whether criminal fines or civil forfeitures are 
necessary or desirable remedies in a state-enforced antitrust policy. 
However, the general reluctance to impose jail sentences and the need  
to make antitrust violations unprofitable suggest that some form of 
fine or forfeiture may be necessary in a state-enforced antitrust statute.
III. S o m e  M y t h s , P r e s u m p t io n s ,  a n d  P e c u l i a r it i e s  o f  C r i m i n a l
A n t it r u s t  E n f o r c e m e n t
Certain myths and presumptions have plagued an intelligent and 
rational evaluation of criminal antitrust enforcement. In particular, 
criminal antitrust prosecutions have been attacked on three grounds: 
That the antitrust laws are too vague for the imposition of criminal 
penalties upon violators; that the degree of moral turpitude found in 
the mine-run antitrust violation does not justify the punishment in­
volved in branding an individual a criminal; and that the assessment
co E.g., A la .  C ode tit. 57, §§ 106-08; A riz . R e v . S t a t .  A n n . § 44-1408 (1956); C a l .  
B u s . & P r o f .  C ode § 16,755 (1937); C o lo . R e v . S t a t .  A n n . § 55-4-2 (1963); I I I .  R e v . S t a t .  
ch. 38, § 60-6 (Supp. 1966); M ass. G en . L aw s A n n . ch. 93, § 1 (1958); N.Y. G en . B u s . L a w  
§ 341 (Supp. 1967).
60 See App. B, infra, where state forfeiture provisions are collected. Texas seems to 
use per diem monetary forfeitures for antitrust enforcement more than any other state. 
See Moody, supra note 46, at 126-35.
61 Very often the stigma of being labeled a criminal is far greater punishment than 
the fine or ja il sentence th a t may be assessed. See E. S u th e r la n d ,  supra note 2, a t 43; 
Goldstein, Police Discretion N ot to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions 
in  the Administration of Justice, 69 Y a le  L.J. 543, 590-91 (1960); note 176 infra and 
accompanying text.
62 See U nited States v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1943). B u t see note 155 infra and 
accompanying text. For an analysis of the Government’s difficulty in prosecuting a 
criminal antitrust case see Tim berg, T he Case for Civil A ntitrust Enforcement, 14 O h io  
S t . L.J. 135 (1953).
63 See Steru, supra  note 35, a t 743-44.
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of responsibility for a violation is all but impossible because of the 
size and complexity of the m odem  corporation. Before the need and 
form of jail sentences and fines in federal and state antitrust enforce­
ment are considered specifically, the myths and presumptions that 
underlie these attacks upon criminal antitrust sanctions should be 
placed in proper perspective.
A. Vagueness of the Substantive Offense
Many have argued that the antitrust laws are so vague and the 
corresponding potential liability so great that it is unfair to enforce 
the antitrust laws by criminal sanctions.64 Undeniably, the outer fringes 
of antitrust enforcement are vague:65 vague in the scope of conduct 
proscribed, vague in the legal standard used to evaluate a course of 
action, and vague in the quantum and quality of proof necessary to 
prove a violation. Moreover, like some statutes,66 and more than most 
statutes,67 the antitrust laws are in constant flux and evolution. As the 
national economy, marketing techniques, business policy, and a host 
of other factors that give impetus and direction to individual business 
judgments evolve, interpretation and application of the antitrust laws 
shift and change to keep pace.68
T he vagueness objection, however, has grown out of proportion 
and become a myth.69 T he growth of the myth has been aided and
64 E.g., C. K ay sen  & D. T u r n e r ,  A n t i t r u s t  P o l ic y :  A n  E co n o m ic  a n d  L e g a l  A n a ly s is  
256 (1959); Chadwell, supra note 3; Comment, supra note 3, at 532.
65 Certain types of Robinson-Patman Act cases and extended rule of reason cases 
under the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal T rade Commission Acts are particularly open to 
objection on this ground. Even so, federal and most state antitrust legislation have w ith­
stood repeated attacks by parties urging that this legislation is unconstitutionally vague. 
E.g., U nited States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) (§ 3 of the Robinson- 
Patm an Act); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913) (rule of reason imported into 
the Sherman Act); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909) (Texas antitrust 
legislation; the first vagueness attack on an antitrust statute); cf. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 
274 U.S. 445 (1927) (Colorado antitrust statute unconstitutionally vague); International 
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914) (Kentucky antitrust statute unconstitu­
tionally vague); People v. Building Maintenance Contractors’ Ass’n, 41 Cal. 2d 719, 264 
P.2d 31 (1953) (proviso in California antitrust statute unconstitutionally vague). See 
generally A t t ’y  G en . N a t ’l  C om m . A n t i t r u s t  R ep . 5-12 (1955) (rule of reason); J . F ly n n ,  
supra note 35, a t 44-48 (vagueiless of state antitrust legislation).
66 For an interesting analysis of statutory construction and its relation to the subject 
m atter of the statute see E. L evi, A n  I n t r o d u c t io n  t o  L e g a l  R e a so n in g  27-57 (1961 ed.).
67 T he Sherman Act has been equated with the Constitution for purposes of 
flexibility of interpretation and growth by judicial review. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. 
United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
68 See, e.g., U nited States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (joint venture); 
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (intra-enterprise 
conspiracy); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. U nited States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (the depression 
price-fixing case).
69 This may prevent an intelligent evaluation of the use of criminal sanctions in  
antitrust enforcement. See, e.g., Cahill, supra note 1. B ut see W ithrow, Compliance w ith the 
Antitrust Laws, 9 N.Y.L.F. 187 (1962). • • .
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abetted by the “judiocentric” orientation of lawyers and legal com­
mentators who read only the often long and sometimes confusing 
opinions of courts. Largely unnoticed are the vast numbers of anti­
trust violations prosecuted by the federal government that seldom  
provoke a judicial opinion and seldom receive more than cursory 
notice by the courts and commentators.70 From 1950 to 1959, eighty- 
seven percent of the civil antitrust cases pursued to remedy by the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice were settled by con­
sent decrees. During the same period, eighty-two percent of the crim­
inal antitrust cases pursued to remedy by the Antitrust Division were 
settled by nolo contendere pleas.71 In many, if not most of these cases, 
the defendants were charged with per se violations of the antitrust 
laws.72 W hile the percentage of actual cases terminated by nolo con­
tendere pleas and consent decrees may in part be explained by a desire 
to avoid the expense and notoriety of a criminal prosecution73 or the 
effect of a prima facie case under section 5 of the Clayton Act in sub­
sequent treble damage actions,74 an equally plausible, but seldom 
mentioned, explanation for this phenomenon is that the defendants 
have been caught in a clear-cut violation and they know it.
T he lack of uncertainty about whether activity is or is not viola­
tive of the antitrust laws seems more prevalent at the local level. In  
those states actively enforcing their antitrust laws, almost all cases 
prosecuted are of the per se variety;75 and the vast majority of federal 
cases involving local restraints of trade, which should be remedied by 
state antitrust enforcement but are handled by the Antitrust Division 
of the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission be­
cause of state inaction, are per se cases.76
A final factor deflating the vagueness myth and mitigating the
70 w .  H a m i l to n  & I. T i l l ,  supra note 3, a t 88; Note, Proposal for Legislative Revisions 
of the Criminal Phases of the A nti-Trust Laws, 3 U.C.L.A.L. R e v . 650 (1956).
71 App. A, T able II, infra.
72 Comment, The Frequency of Price Fixing: A n  Indication, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 151 
(1962). This seems to be particularly true of essentially local restraints of trade. See J. 
F ly n n ,  supra note 35, App., Table IV. ‘
73 W. H a m i l to n  & I. T i l l ,  supra note 3, at 57; Hansen, The A ntitrust Laws in a 
Changing Economy, 6 U.C.L.A.L. R e v . 183 (1959).
74 See generally text accompanying notes 121-39 infra. For discussion of the effect of 
nolo pleas and guilty pleas in subsequent treble damage actions see Note, The Admissi­
bility and Scope of Guilty Pleas in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 71 Y a le  L.J. 684
(1965).
75 E.g., D a l l a s  B a r  Ass’n , F a l l  A n t i t r u s t  C l in ic  126-35 (1953), reprinted in Moody, 
supra note 46, at 126-35 (collecting the Texas cases from 1947 to 1952); J. F ly n n ,  supra 
note 35, App. P art II; N e w  Y o rk  S t a t e  B a r  Ass’n , supra no te  35, a t 24a-48a, 65a-88a; Rahl, 
supra note 35, a t 766-71; Sieker, The Role of the States in  A ntitrust Law Enforcement— 
Some Views and Observations, 39 T e x a s  L. R e v . 873 (1961).
76 j .  F ly n n , ' supra note 35, App., T able IV (1964); Rahl, supra note 35, at 770-71.
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unfairness of using criminal sanctions in antitrust enforcement is the 
exercise of discretion in selecting cases for criminal prosecution. Those 
cases involving dubious questions of antitrust liability because of the 
vagueness of evolving antitrust policy or the questionable effect of a 
particular type of conduct are not prosecuted criminally. T he an­
nounced policy of the Antitrust Division is to reserve criminal sanc­
tions for clear-cut antitrust violations of the per se variety.77 This 
policy, when coupled with the newly enacted Civil Investigative De­
mand Bill78 obviating the use of grand juries for investigative pur­
poses, lends weight to the belief that criminal sanctions and procedures 
are usually used only when they are deserved.79
In order to determine which remedies are fair, proper, or neces­
sary for the enforcement of state and federal antitrust laws, the ques­
tion of antitrust vagueness must be placed in proper perspective. The  
proposals in this article are premised upon the author’s conclusion 
that criminal sanctions are only -imposed in clear-cut cases of viola­
tion.80 T o  be sure, there are areas of uncertainty causing confusion 
and frustration in  the business world, where competitive business 
conduct may be stifled by a fear of unknown antitrust liability. But
77 A t t ’y  Gen. N a t ’l  Comm. A n t i t r u s t  R ep. 350 (1955). T h e  A n titru s t Division has 
recently  re ite ra ted  th is policy. See P resid en t’s Comm, o n  L aw  E n fo rce m e n t a n d  Ad­
m in is tra tio n  o f  Ju s tic e , supra n o te  45, a t  109-12. A study  o£ all com plaints an d  ind ic t­
m ents b ro u g h t b y  the  federal governm ent since 1890 confirms th e  v ita lity  of th is policy. 
N onetheless, there  is some evidence of an  abuse of d iscretion by  th e  A n titru s t Division. 
F o r exam ple, i t  has been  ru m o red  th a t  special sections have been set up  from  tim e to 
tim e w ith in  th e  A n titru s t D ivision to  w atch  one p a rticu la r  business en tity . If th is be  true, 
i t  m ay re su lt in  over-zealous app lication  of crim inal sanctions and  w h a t can only b e  
called a p ro stitu tio n  of th e  crim inal sanction. See, e.g., U n ited  States v. General M otors 
Corp., 5 T ra d e  Reg. R ep. 45,061 (1965) (the first crim inal m onopoly  case, la te r  nolle 
prosequi); U n ited  States v. G eneral M otors Corp., 216 F. Supp. 362 (S.D. Calif. 1963). T h e  
same h igh  standards o f fairness th a t  a re  applicable elsewhere in  crim inal enforcem ent 
app ly  equally  in  crim inal a n titru s t cases. See,- e.g., U n ited  States v. Consolidated L aundries 
Corp., 391 F.2d 563 (2d C ir. 1961) (negligent suppression of evidence by  th e  G overnm ent 
v itia ted  low er court conviction); U n ited  States v. N ew  O rleans C hapter, Associated G en'l 
C ontractors, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 273 (EX). La.), rev’d on other grounds, 382 U.S. 17 (1965). 
T h e  flexibility in  crim inal a n titru s t  cases is caused by  th e  no tion  of conspiracy. T h e  
essence of a  Sherm an A ct v iolation is a  conspiracy, one of th e  broadest standards of 
illegality  found  in  th e  crim inal law. See N ote, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Sherman 
A ntitrust Acts, 13 G eo. W a sh . L. R e v . 434, 447-52 (1945). Even so, th e  ind ic tm en t o r 
in fo rm ation  in  a  crim inal a n titru s t case m ust m eet th e  same standards o f certain ty  as 
app lied  elsewhere in  crim inal law. See U nited  States v. A .P. W oodson Co., 198 F. Supp. 
579 (D.D.C. 1961). See generally C ed i, supra n o te  18.
78 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1964), analyzed in  Decker, T he Civil Investigative Demand,
21 ABA A n t i t r u s t  S e c tio n  370 (1962). Prior to the passage of the Civil Investigative 
Demand Bill the A ntitrust Division used the grand jury  for investigative purposes. See 
A t t ’y  G en . N a t ’l  Com m . A n t i t r u s t  R e p . 343-49 (1955).
79 Unequal enforcement does not seem prevalent. Of course, the prosecutor’s dis­
cretion may be abused. If this were occurring, it  would be a powerful argum ent for 
eliminating criminal sanctions and the prosecutor’s discretion to enforce the law in­
equitably.
so This factual conclusion is based in  tu rn  upon the author’s reading of all the 
complaints and indictments filed from 1890-1960 when preparing App. A, infra.
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the risk of criminal liability for venturing into a practice subsequently 
condemned as violative of antitrust policy is substantially mitigated 
by the practice of reserving criminal sanctions for clear-cut violations. 
Therefore, the vagueness myth has little relevance to the question 
whether antitrust policy once well-defined, should be enforced by 
criminal sanctions.
B. M oral T u rp itu d e  and the G ravity of the Offense
Even the most ardent of “trustbusters” agree that a violation of 
the antitrust laws is not normally a crime involving “moral turpi­
tude.”81 Consequently, antitrust violations are classified as m alum  p ro ­
h ib itu m  crimes rather than m ala in se crimes.82 This distinction is 
relevant to the determination whether the panoply of criminal proce­
dure with its attendant stigma and personal humiliation should be 
applied to antitrust offenders. A t issue is whether antitrust violations 
should be treated like minor traffic violations, where the issuance of 
a citation and brief court appearance are the only vestiges of criminal 
procedure, or like major criminal violations where the more humiliat­
ing aspects of the criminal process are applied, such as arrest, finger­
printing, photographing the defendant, and bail. It is argued that the 
formal criminal procedure applicable when the accused is charged 
with and prosecuted for a serious crime should not be invoked for a 
crime that does not involve moral turpitude.83 It is important, there­
fore, to determine whether antitrust violations are crimes of moral 
turpitude; and if not, whether something less than the full criminal 
process and sanctions should be applied in antitrust cases.
If a crime is defined as “conduct, which, if  duly shown to have 
taken place, w ill incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the 
moral condemnation of the community,”84 and the broad social pur­
pose of criminal law as “defining the minimum conditions of man’s 
responsibility to his fellows,”85 it is apparent that the mores of the 
community provide much of the foundation of the criminal law.86
81 E.g., Arnold, A ntitrust Law Enforcement, Past and Future, 7 L a w  & C ontem p. 
P rob . 5, 11 (1940). .
82 Newman, White-Collar Crime, 23 L a w  & C o n tem p . P ro b . 735, 738-39 (1958).
83 T his proposition is discussed in  Kadish, supra note 3.
84 H art, The A im s of the Criminal Law, 23 L a w  & C o n te m p . P ro b . 401, 403 (1958); 
cf. M o d e l  P e n a l  C ode § 1.02 (P.O.D. 1962).
85 H art, supra note 84, a t 410. '
86 Even Bentham recognized an element of m orality as a p a rt of criminal law. He 
saw as the business of government the promotion of the happiness of society by punish­
ing and rewarding. J . B e n th a m , T h e  T h e o r y  o f  L e g is la t io n  27-30 (C. Ogden ed. 1931). 
Of course, what constitutes the happiness of society largely depends upon the mores of 
the particular society. T he criminal law promotes- happiness by utilizing sanctions as
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But the word “mores” is not used here to niean just the prevailing 
viewpoint of the community at any one time. Rather, it is used to 
mean the deep-seated convictions of a particular society; convictions 
drawn from the history of that society; the economic and political 
presumptions upon which that society is built; the religious, cultural, 
and other basic factors which form a community conviction concern­
ing the distinction between right and wrong.
Since our economic system is based upon a philosophy of private 
enterprise and competition,87 and since experience has amply demon­
strated the necessity for a government-enforced antitrust policy, it is 
clear that antitrust violations run counter to the mores of the prevail­
ing economic and political philosophy of the citizens of the United  
States.88 It is not too much to say that private combinations setting up 
private governments in parts of the economy are just as destructive 
and defeating of the present economic system in the United States as 
socialism and other collectivistic economic systems would be destructive 
of the basic presumptions of our economic system.89 In this sense, 
therefore, antitrust violations may be said to violate the strongly en­
trenched mores in the United States and involve questions of moral 
right and wrong.
But to say that an antitrust violation is a crime of moral turpitude 
is another matter. Economic mores and human morality cannot be 
equated except perhaps in the unreal world of extreme left- and right- 
wing economic and political theory. Moreover, illegal restraints of 
trade are not foul or base in the minds of most individuals,90 unless
deterrents. See id. a t 26; cf. O. H olm es, T h e  Common L a w  41 (1881) (th e  "first req u ire ­
m en t o f a  sound body of law  is th a t i t  should  correspond w ith  the  actual feelings and  
dem ands of the  com m unity, w h e th er r ig h t o r  w rong”).
87 One estimate, not including m inor local u tility  regulations, patents, fair trade, 
export trade associations, and some of the smaller natural resource industries, places the 
percentage of national income exempt from the antitrust laws as of 1954 a t  18.4%. C. Kay- 
se n  & D. T u r n e r ,  supra note 64, a t 42, table 4.
88 See generally A . B e r le ,  T h e  A m e ric a n  E c o n o m ic  R e p u b lic  (1963). T he defenders of 
the private enterprise system, though not always sympathetic to current enforcement trends, 
recognize the antitrust laws as an integral part of the competitive system. See A t t ’y  G en . 
N a t ’l  Com m . A n t i t r u s t  R e p . 1 (1955); Oppenheim, A ntitrust Booms and Boomerangs,
59 N w . U X . R e v . 33 (1964); cf. 1964 Laws of Puerto Rico, act 77, preamble.
89 Smith, The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy, 63 F o r tu n e ,  A pril 1961, at 132, 134; 
cf. U nited States v. Standard U ltram arine & Color Co., 137 F . Supp. 167, 170 (S.D.N.Y.
1955): "Upon [the] vigorous and constant enforcement [of the antitrust laws] depends 
the economic, political and social well-being of our nation. T he concept tha t antitrust 
violations really are ‘m inor’ and ‘technical’ infractions, involve no wrongdoing, and 
merely constitute ‘white collar' offenses, has no place in the administration of justice.’’ 
T he advertising and public statements of the managers of American business suggest tha t 
they are in wholehearted agreement w ith the philosophy of competition. See generally 
S u t to n ,  H a r r i s ,  K ay sen  & T o b in , T h e  A m e ric a n  B usiness C reed  (1956).
so Newman, supra note 82, at 744. “T urpitude” is derived from the Latin “turpitudo,” 
meaning “foul" o r “base” in  the sense of depravity. W e b s te r 's  C o l l e g i a t e  D ic t io n a r y  
1080 (5th ed. 1936).
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the restraint happens to involve economic racketeering or perhaps 
breaches of trust by labor leaders.91
Antitrust violations are often equated with traffic violations for 
purposes of analyzing the degree of moral turpitude involved.92 The  
better view, however, distinguishes these two types of violations. 
Sutherland, in his classic study of “white collar crime,” found the 
difference to rest in the arbitrariness of traffic regulations as opposed 
to our deep philosophical commitment to a “free enterprise” eco­
nomic system:
Those who insist that moral culpability is a necessary 
element in a crime argue that criminality is lacking in the 
violations of laws which have eliminated the stigma from 
crime. This involves the general question of the relation of 
criminal law to the mores. T he laws with which we are here 
concerned are not arbitrary, as in the regulation that one must 
drive on the right side of the street. T he Sherman Antitrust 
Law, for example, represents a settled tradition in favor of 
free competition and free enterprise. This ideology is ob­
vious in the resentment against communism. A  violation of 
the antitrust law is a violation of strongly entrenched moral 
sentiments.93
An observer’s viewpoint toward the degree of moral turpitude 
implied by an antitrust violation depends more on his evaluation of 
substantive antitrust law and his attitude toward laissez-faire capital­
ism than upon a survey of community sentiment. He may reach a 
conclusion on the advisability of applying criminal sanctions against 
antitrust violators without examining his attitude toward substantive 
antitrust policy. This explains a basic inconsistency in antitrust criti­
cism:
Liberally orientated social scientists, otherwise critical of the 
case made for the deterrent and vindicatory uses of punish­
91 T h e  earlie r history  of th e  Sherm an Act indicates the  crim inal sanctions o f the  
an titru s t laws were used p rim arily  against lab o r leaders. See W . H a m ilto n  & I. T i l l ,  
supra note  3, a t  121; T h e  F e d e ra l A n t i t r u s t  Law s w ith  Sum m ary o f  Cases In s t i tu te d  
b y  t h e  U.S. 1890-1951, Case Nos. 8a, 8b, 102, 103, 167, 170, 171 (CCH 1952). T o  a  certain  
extent, th e  same seems to be  tru e  today w here th e  activity of lab o r defendants is outside 
th e  scope of th e  lab o r exem ption from  th e  an titru s t laws. See, e.g., Las Vegas M erchant 
P lum bers Ass’n  v. U n ited  States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
92jE.g., Arnold, supra note 81, at 11.
S3 E. S u th e r la n d ,  supra  note 2, at 45; accord, Loevinger, The New Frontier in A n ti­
trust, 39 T e x a s  L. R e v . 865, 866 (1961), where the then Assistant Attorney General in  
charge of the A ntitrust Division stated: " It should now be clear that a deliberate or con­
scious violation of the antitrust laws is not a mere personal peccadillo o r economic 
eccentricity, bu t a serious offense against society which is as immoral as any other act 
that injures many iu  order to profit a few. Conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws is 
economic racketeering which gains no respectability by virtue of the fact that the loot is 
secured by stealth ra ther than by force.”
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ment of ordinary offenders, may be found supporting stem  
penal enforcement against economic violators. At the same 
time conservative groups, rarely foes of rigorous punishment 
for ordinary offenders, appear less sanguine for the criminal 
prosecution when punishment of business offenders is de­
bated.94
But reflection upon the unique characteristics of this type of 
crime suggests other reasons for these seemingly inconsistent view­
points toward criminal enforcement of the antitrust laws. First, white 
collar crimes, particularly antitrust violations, are “complex and their 
effects, diffused.”95 T he gist of an antitrust violation is beyond the 
understanding and everyday experience of the vast majority of citizens, 
even when they are victims of the violation. T he corpus de lic ti is subtle 
— the victim, whether person or property, is not normally physically 
injured and the fact that a crime is taking place is not readily ap­
parent.96 T he method of committing the crime is subtle and without 
violence, and the public is'generally unaware of the event. T he per­
petrators of the violation are, more often than not, respectable mem­
bers and leaders of the community. It is as.difficult to arouse public 
opinion in condemnation of an act that has no apparent effect upon 
society as it is to penalize criminally an individual whose life is other­
wise morally, praiseworthy for conduct beyond the realm of community 
understanding.
Secondly, the news media often fail to arouse public sentiment 
against antitrust violations by widely reporting their discovery and 
describing their impact upon the victims. Whether this is because 
there is a community of interest between the news media and the 
class most often violating the antitrust laws, as has been charged,97 
or because the news media do not consider antitrust violations news­
worthy items, the result is the same. T he public is generously made 
aware of the details of the latest local murder, rape, or theft involving 
personal tragedy to a limited number of individuals, but is not gen­
erally informed of antitrust violations adversely affecting the entire
94 Radish, supra note 3, a t 424. ' ‘
95 E. S u th e r la n d ,  supra no te  2, a t 50.
96 E.g., U nited States v. Bituminous Concrete Ass’n, 1960 T rade Cas. ^  69,878 (D. 
Mass.); see Smith, supra note 89.. ~ '
- 97 E. S u th e r la n d ,  supra note 2, a t 50-51; Radish, supra note 3, a t 435. A survey of 
news coverage of the electrical conspiracy cases, the largest criminal antitrust case in 
history, bears out Sutherland’s indictm ent of the news media. Most newspaper^ gave 
-scanty coverage to the case and usually buried the story on the inside pages. See N ew  
R e p u b lic , Feb. 20, 1961, a t 7. A post-sentencing survey of newspapers concerning the 
same case showed a similar result. Note, supra note 26, a t 288-89 n.35.
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community and often involving the restraint of millions of dollars of 
trade and commerce. Since the public is rarely informed of the oc­
currence or effects of antitrust violations, it is not surprising that pub­
lic resentment is seldom aroused.98 Therefore, the imposition of a 
criminal sanction upon antitrust violators has little educational value 
to the public, and the argument that these are m alum  p ro h ib itu m  
crimes gains weight since the mores of the community cannot be 
formulated without knowledge of the conduct going on and its impact 
upon society.
A  third distinguishing characteristic of “white collar” crime in 
the antitrust area is the gravity of the offense. Diffusion of the impact 
of the violation over a wide geographic or large consumer market 
frequently disguises the total gravity of the offense. Very often, how­
ever, an illegal restraint of trade may net the guilty parties many 
thousands or millions of dollars in illegal profits,99 or make possible 
the reaping of untold profits by the elimination of competitors by 
illegal means.100 A  recent indictment in the 3.6 billion dollar carbon 
steel industry suggested that antitrust violations may also have a sub­
stantial impact upon the national economy and contribute heavily to 
the so-called inflationary spiral because of the basic product in­
volved.101 Although the normal antitrust violation involves far greater
98 Occasionally, high calibre reporting can make the public aware of questionable 
business practices or undesirable economic trends. See, e.g., Harris, The Real Voice (pts. 
1-3), N e w  Y o rk e r ,  March 14, 1964, a t 48, March 21, a t 75, March 28, a t 46 (report on 
Senator Kefauver’s investigation of the drug industry); Smith, supra note 89. U nfortu­
nately, the American news media seldom rise to such heights.
oo T he so-called Electrical Equipm ent Conspiracy Cases, e.g., U nited States v. West- 
inghouse Elec. Corp., 1960 T rade Cas. If 69,699 (E.D. Pa. 1960), involved products whose 
aggregate annual sales exceeded §1.7 billion and resulted in corporate fines of §1,721,000, 
individual fines of §136,000, and 31 thirty-day ja il sentences, 24 of which were suspended. 
See W atkins, supra note 30. A t the state level, antitrust violations have included price 
fixing and territorial restrictions on the sale of washing machines throughout Texas, see 
Moody, supra note 46, a t 127 (§50,000 in  penalties assessed against nine defendants); 
monopolization of sugar production and sales in  Louisiana, State v. American Sugar Ref. 
Co., 138 La. 1005, 71 So. 137 (1916); price fixing of milk, State v. Golden Guernsey Dairy 
Co-op, 257 Wis. 254, 43 N.W.2d 31 (1950), and salt, State v. Allied Chem. & Die Corp., 9 
Wis. 2d 290, 101 N.W.2d 133 (1960), in  Wisconsin; a  secondary boycott of out-of-state prod­
ucts in  New York, Mayer Bros. Poultry Farms v. Meltzer, 274 App. Div. 169, 80 N.Y.S.2d 
874 (1948); and bid rigging o£ gymnasium bleachers in  Illinois and Minnesota, see 153 BNA 
A n t i t r u s t  & T r a d e  R e g . R e p ., a t A11-A12 (1964) (settled by Illinois for §300,000, by M in­
nesota for §717,637). For a fuller enumeration of recent state action against restraints of 
trade see N e w  Y o rk  S t a t e  B a r  A ss’n , supra note 35, at 65a-89a. For an enumeration of 
recent federal action against local restraints of trade see J . F ly n n ,  supra note 35, App.
(1964). W hile the products involved may seem insignificant in  most state cases, the dollar 
volume involved in  the line of trade and commerce often exceeds one m illion dollars and 
the economic in jury  to a geographically limited consumer m arket is significant.
100 See, e.g., U nited States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F 5 d  416 (2d Cir. 1945); 
U nited States v. U nited Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d  per 
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); E. S u th e r la n d ,  supra note 2, a t 50.
101 United States v. U nited States Steel Corp., 1964 T rade Cas. 71,208 (S.D.N.Y.). T he
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sums of money than most thefts by force or fraud and has a far greater 
impact upon the welfare of society than most crimes of violence, it 
paradoxically is subject to less, if  any, public resentment. However, 
even if the crime is one not involving moral turpitude, the effect of 
the violation is usually so grave that use of the full process of the 
criminal law seems justified if it is assumed that criminal sanctions 
can deter prohibited conduct.
A  fourth factor distinguishing white collar antitrust violations from 
most crimes is that the violators do not think of themselves as crim­
inals and feel no moral responsibility.102 This phenomenon is perhaps 
attributable to the individual’s viewpoint toward the substantive law, 
his beliefs concerning government regulation of business, and the 
social and business atmosphere in which the violator lives and works.108 
W ithout a firm conviction of the justness and rightness of antitrust 
policy and government regulation, voluntary compliance as a matter 
of intellectual conviction is difficult to obtain and the advisability of 
utilizing penal sanctions to enforce the statute becomes a confused 
issue. On the one hand the coercive effect of penal sanctions may be 
required to insure compliance in spite of the individual’s convictions 
concerning the basic law; conversely, the use of penal sanctions to 
enforce a law considered to be unfair, unjust, and unwise may only 
heighten disrespect for the law in general and increase violations of 
the objectionable statute. Moreover, it cannot be argued that the re­
habilitative function of criminal law is served by imprisoning corpo­
rate executives for antitrust violations. T o  the extent the threat of 
punishment can cure acquisitive tendencies with antisocial effects, it 
is possible that the existence of criminal sanctions serves some rehabili­
tative function. But this possibility is too slender a reed to support 
a criminal sanction; in fact, a criminal sanction may increase disre­
spect for antitrust policy, since the remedy seems vindictive rather 
than vindicative. Consequently, the effectiveness of criminal sanctions 
in antitrust cannot be divorced from individual attitudes toward sub­
stantive antitrust policy, and an intelligent evaluation of the utility
Government quickly settled the case by accepting nolo pleas. T he importance o£ the case 
and the circumstances of the settlement have raised some serious questions. See Note, 
Section 5 of the Clayton Act and the Nolo Contendere Plea, 75 Y a le  L.J. 845 (1966).
102 e . S u th e r la n d ,  supra note 2, a t 223-24; see United States v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 1960 T rade Cas. J  69,699 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (where attorneys representing defendants 
in  the “Electrical Equipm ent Conspiracy Cases” characterized antitrust violations as 
“crimes having to do w ith regulation of the economy” and no t “crimes of violence,” "trea­
son,” o r “other serious crimes against the government”).
103 Lane, W hy Businessmen Violate the Law, 44 J . Crim. L.C. & P.S. 151, 161 (1953). 
See generally M . C lin a rd ,  T h e  B la c k  M a r k e t  (1952).
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of sanctions founders upon an absence of empirical information on 
their deterrent value in the antitrust field.104
A  fifth distinguishing characteristic of white collar crime in the 
antitrust area is the degree of responsibility among individuals within 
a corporation accused of violating an antitrust statute and the prose­
cutor’s difficulty in assessing responsibility. T he first aspect of the 
responsibility issue is related to the vagueness of the antitrust laws. 
As was pointed out earlier, the vast majority of antitrust violations 
prosecuted criminally by the federal government involve clear-cut per 
se violations. W hile it may be questionable whether certain activity 
may fall within the per se violations,105 the Government in its dis­
cretion ordinarily reserves criminal sanctions for clear-cut violations.106 
Moreover, those violating the antitrust laws normally have high cali­
ber legal advice prior to launching any type of business venture and 
after being charged with an antitrust violation by the Government, 
are intelligent, have the advantage of an extensive education, and—  
from what evidence is available—do not usually violate the antitrust 
laws because of ignorance of their existence or content.107 Conse­
104 A severe hand icap  to th e  analysis o f crim inal a n titru s t sanctions generally  is a b ­
sence of em pirical research in to  th e  crim inology of w hite  collar crimes. R elatively  little  
has been done since S u therland’s p ioneer w ork in  the  way of exam in ing  w hy such crimes 
are com m itted, w ha t th e  effect o f a  crim inal sanction is u p o n  th e  v iolator, and  w hether 
antisocial conduct labeled  w h ite  collar crim e should  be  punishab le  by  crim inal sanctions. 
T h e  work of an  e igh teen th-cen tury  th inker, Jerem y B entham , rem ains th e  basis fo r m uch  
m o d em  th ink ing . C onsequently, i t  is n o t strange th a t  th e  stu d en t o f a n titru s t is largely 
ig n o ran t of th e  im pact o f p en al sanctions. B ut see R adish, supra no te  S. T h e  P residen t’s 
Commission on  Law E nforcem ent a n d  A dm inistra tion  of Justice no ted  th e  w idespread 
prevalence of w h ite  collar crimes a n d  th e  general lack o f em pirical research on th e  ques­
tion . See P resid en t’s Comm’n o n  L aw  E n fo rce m e n t & A d m in is tra tio n  o f  Ju s tice , supra 
note 45, a t  109. U n til extensive research is engaged in  by  th e  social sciences a n d  legal 
scholars, crim inal sanctions in  a n titru s t enforcem ent w ill be  a  controversial subject and  
m u ch  o f the  controversy w ill b e  based u p o n  m yths an d  presum ptions ra th e r  th an  facts.
105 See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); U nited States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. U nited States, 
288 U.S. 344 (1933); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). _
106 In  response to a query from the Attorney General’s Committee to Study the A nti­
trust Law, the A ntitrust Division of the D epartm ent of Justice reported: _
In  general, the following types of offenses are prosecuted criminally: (1) price 
fixing; (2) other violations of the Sherman Act where there is proof of a specific 
in tent to restrain trade or to  monopolize; (3) a less easily defined category of 
cases which might generally be described as involving proof of use of predatory 
practices (boycotts, for example) to accomplish the objective of the combination or 
conspiracy; (4) the feet that a defendant has previously been convicted of, or 
adjudged to have been, violating the antitrust laws may w arrant indictm ent for 
a second offense. T here are other factors taken into account in determining 
w hether to seek an indictm ent in  cases that may no t fall precisely in any of these 
categories. T he Division feels free to seek an indictm ent in  any case where a 
prospective defendant has knowledge tha t practices similar to those in  which lie 
is engaging have been held to be in  violation of the Sherman Act in a prior 
civil suit against other persons.
A t t ’y  G en . N a t ’l  C om m . A n t i t r u s t  R e p . 350 (1955).
107 Lane, supra note 103-
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quently, the responsibility o£ an individual violating the antitrust 
laws is much greater than the responsibility of the average violator 
of the criminal law who often lacks legal counsel before and after his 
offense, comes from a degrading environment, or suffers from some 
type of mental or psychological difficulty.
T he prosecutor’s task in assessing responsibility, however, is often 
a difficult proposition. In many large corporations managerial respon­
sibility is so diffused and internal lines of responsibility are so tenu­
ous that the ultimate responsibility for a criminal antitrust violation 
cannot be placed with certainty.108 This difficulty, of course, dulls the 
effectiveness of the criminal sanction in antitrust enforcement since 
those ultimately responsible for the violation escape punishment and 
those who are punished or are subject to punishment are not totally 
responsible. These uneven results create a sense of dissatisfaction with 
criminal antitrust enforcement, since the most guilty may escape lia­
bility.
Finally, for purposes of analyzing state antitrust sanctions, a 
peculiarity of local antitrust violations must be taken into considera­
tion. Antitrust violations at the local level tend to be of the more 
clear-cut or per se variety. In most cases in which a state antitrust 
statute has been applied or should have been applied, the violation is 
per se and the offending parties are individuals, small corporations, or 
small business or labor organizations.109 Consequently, violations are 
easily proved, responsibility for the violation is easier to assess, and 
the injury and injured are seldom so widely diffused as to obfuscate 
the gravity of the offense in the mind of the public.110
108 T his allegation seems to have been particularly true in  the Electrical Equipment 
Conspiracy Cases, and one of the prim ary factors for the violations. For many observers 
it  was difficult to believe th a t the upper echelon of company executives could not have 
known of the violations. On the other hand, the decentralization programs of some of 
the electrical companies made it easy to understand tha t top management would find it 
difficult to prevent lower echelon executives under external competitive pressures and in ­
ternal management pressures from surreptitiously violating the antitrust laws. See gen­
erally Smith, supra note 89; W atkins, supra note 30. These cases may have had the salutary 
effect of inducing self-regulation in  large corporate entities. See W hiting, supra note 55, 
a t 3.
109 See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
110 Federal criminal antitrust enforcement has been criticized on the ground that 
because assessment of criminal responsibility is easier in  the small closely-held corporation 
or small trade association, criminal sanctions are not applied equally, since the manage­
ments of large corporations are seldom convicted while those of small corporations are 
convicted. Comment, supra note 3, a t 540-41. W hether this is an argum ent for abolish­
m ent of criminal sanctions, for the imposition of liability upon responsible corporate 
officials w ithout having to show mens rea or knowledge, see Note, supra note 26, a t 302-03, 
or for federal incorporation laws to give federal officials power to restructure and govern 
internal structure of unwieldy corporations, see Watkins, supra note 30, a t 108-10, has not 
been answered. -
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W ith these observations in mind, the following conclusions may 
be drawn: (1) Antitrust violations do contain an element of moral 
wrong, but are not crimes of moral turpitude. (2) T he class of in­
dividuals normally violating this type of regulation and the problem  
of placing responsibility within the corporate structure make it diffi­
cult and rare to assess the full measure of criminal sanctions now avail­
able under the antitrust laws against the individuals truly responsible 
for the violation. (3) Those violating the antitrust laws should be 
held to a high degree of responsibility in view of the certainty of 
standards in many areas of antitrust regulation, the availability and 
use of well-trained counsel by many of those indicted for antitrust 
violations, and the high degree of intelligence, education, and social 
background of the normal antitrust violator. (4) T he gravity of an 
antitrust offense, whether statewide or on a national scale, often far 
exceeds the material public harm involved in most criminal acts.
C. Assessing C rim inal R espon sib ility
Perhaps of more interest in the development of criminal antitrust 
remedies and a peculiarity of criminal antitrust enforcement is the 
difficulty of assessing individual responsibility within the corporate 
structure for corporate antitrust violations.111 Federal enforcement 
officials are increasing their efforts to make this assessment.112 Since 
one weakness of criminal antitrust enforcement has been the Govern­
ment’s inability to assess criminal liability against the individual re­
sponsible for a corporate act or policy violating the law,113 this trend 
may be viewed as an effort by federal enforcement officials to over­
come one of the more basic objections to criminal antitrust enforce­
ment and make the criminal antitrust sanction more effective.
In their effort to hold corporate executives criminally liable for 
corporate antitrust violations, federal officials may rely on section 14 of 
the Clayton Act,114 which imposes criminal liability upon corporate 
officers, directors, and agents where they have “authorized, ordered or 
done any of the acts constituting in whole or in part” the corporation’s 
violation of the “penal provisions of the antitrust laws,” and on the
111 See generally Kadish, supra  no te  3; W atkins, supra  n o te  30; W hiting , Antitrust 
and the Corporate Executive  (pts. 1-2), 47 V a. L . Rev. 929, 48 V a. L . Rev. 1 (1961-1962).
112 T h is  developm ent is evidenced by  th e  tren d  tow ard  nam ing  corporate officers as 
co-defendants in  crim inal a n titru s t prosecutions against corporations. See W hiting , supra 
n o te  111. •
113 T im b erg , supra note  62, a t 320.
114 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
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decision in U n ited  States v. W ise,113 which imposes criminal liability 
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act on corporate officers acting 
in a representative capacity. Thus, corporate officers will be criminally 
liable under the Sherman Act if they have engaged in illegal conduct 
on their own account or on the account of their corporation; they will 
also be subject to the criminal sanctions of section 14 of the Clayton 
Act for violations of that section.116 T he structure of the modern cor­
poration, however, particularly the large and decentralized corpora­
tion, complicates the assessment of individual responsibility for the 
corporation’s antitrust transgressions. Excessive decentralization and 
lower echelon managerial independence may effectively avoid top 
management antitrust responsibility, though they be established for 
sound business reasons. Whether this is an argument in favor of 
abandoning criminal sanctions or one in favor of dissolving large 
corporate entities that violate the antitrust laws with regularity,117 the 
present prospect of achieving either solution is remote. But the 
current situation is unsatisfactory as well, since the assessment of crim­
inal sanctions upon anyone other than those' ultimately responsible 
for the corporation’s antitrust violations may leave the administration 
of the law unfair, unjust, and ineffective. Any suggestion that section 
14 of the Clayton Act be amended to establish a respondeat superior 
standard118 would meet strong opposition and might well discourage 
corporate decentralization and lower echelon managerial indepen­
dence. T he effectiveness of federal antitrust enforcement will rest with 
federal enforcement officials, who must maintain their determination
115 370 U.S. 405 (1962), noted in  48 A.B.A.J. 1071 (1962); 4 B.C. Ind . & Comm. L.J. 177
(1962); 61 M ich. L. Rev. 596 (1963); 4 W m .  & M a ry  L. Rev. 217 (1963). Corporate officers 
are therefore liable for up  to a §50,000 fine instead of the §5,000 lim it under § 14 of the 
Clayton Act, and the standards of proof are the ones available under §§ 1-3 of the Sherman 
Act.
116 T he  language of § 14, although seldom interpreted, does not seem adequate to 
perm it the Government to pierce the mists of diffused responsibility w ithin the corporate 
bureaucracy and hold top management accountable for antitrust violations they induce 
or permit. Apparently, the statute requires tha t there be proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
th a t the corporate officer authorized, ordered or did the “acts” constituting a penal viola­
tion of the antitrust laws. Compare Meehan v. U nited States, 11 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1926), 
w ith  United States v. Mathues, 9 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1925). Such proof would be difficult or 
impossible in cases where a corporate officer has tolerated or indirectly induced antitrust 
violations by subordinates.
117 Many economists approach antitrust remedies from the viewpoint th a t they only 
attack the symptoms, no t the basic causes for anticompetitive conduct. They therefore 
have little interest in  criminal sanctions and stress the necessity for governmental power 
to restructure noncompetitive markets or markets having high concentrations in the form 
of duopoly or oligopoly. See, e.g., C. K aysen & D. T u rn e r ,  supra note 64 a t 234-72; M. 
M assel, C om petition  an d  M o nopo ly  94 (1962); Watkins, supra note 30.
118 T his section now seems to require proof of active illegal conduct. See note 116 
supra.
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to impose criminal liability on the particular corporate officer responsi­
ble for the violation.
A t the local level, however, the difficulty of assessing antitrust 
responsibility should not be as troublesome. In the first place, some 
state statutes expressly provide for managerial liability for corporate 
antitrust violations.119 A second and perhaps more important practical 
factor in assessing criminal responsibility for corporate antitrust viola­
tions at the local level lies in the nature of the restraints local enforce­
ment officials may expect to encounter. As was pointed out earlier,120 
local restraints of trade are generally flagrant violations by small cor­
porations, local unions, or local trade associations. This factor should 
not only make proof of violation simpler, but should also facilitate a 
proper assessment of individual blame within the internal structure 
of the offending entity.
D . N o lo  C ontendere Pleas
Over the history of the enforcement of the federal antitrust laws, 
defendants in seventy-five percent of criminal antitrust cases pursued 
to remedy by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have 
pleaded nolo contendere;121 the corresponding figure for the decade of 
the fifties is eighty-one percent.122 This peculiarity of criminal antitrust 
enforcement may be explained by several factors.123 A major factor is 
the effect of section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, which provides:
A final judgment or decree . . . rendered in any civil or crim­
inal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States 
under the antitrust laws . . . shall be prima facie evidence 
against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought 
by any other party against such defendant under said laws . . . 
as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree 
would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Pro­
v ided , That this section shall not apply to consent judgments 
or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken . . .  .12i
The proviso to this section has generally been construed to include 
nolo contendere pleas,125 but the analogous question whether guilty
119 E.g., C a l.  B us. & P r o f .  C ode § 16755; M ass. G en . L aw s ch . 93, § 10 (1958); R e v . 
C o d e  M o n t .  § 94-1104 (1947); N .M . S t a t .  A n n . § 49-1-1 (1953); N.C. G en . L a w s § 75-6
(1965).
120 T ex t accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
121 App. A, Table I, infra.
122 App. A, Table II, infra.
123 See notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text.
124 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
125 E.g., Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F.2d 779, 784 (2d Cir. 1947); Simco Sales 
Serv., Inc. v. A ir Reduction Co., 213 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Atlantic City Elec.
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pleas are also included or instead merit prima facie effect has not been 
free of doubt. Some have concluded that “a guilty plea falls within  
the proviso and is therefore outside the scope of the section.”126 Others 
have restricted the application of the proviso to consent decrees in  
government civil enforcement and to nolo contendere pleas in crim­
inal actions.127 T he latter position seems, better reasoned, for it can 
give effect to both of the competing interests present: to facilitate 
private treble damage actions and to assist Government enforcement 
“by encouraging defendants to capitulate ,at a saving of time and ex­
pense to the government” in criminal antitrust cases.128
But explaining the high percentage of nolo pleas on the basis of 
escaping the prima facie effect of section 5(a) of the Clayton Act for 
subsequent treble damage actions has tended to obscure the essential 
legal characteristics and implications of the plea, which is something 
more than a mere device for escaping the res judicata effect of a guilty 
plea. At common law a plea of nolo contendere was not a plea in  the 
sense in which that word is now used in  criminal law. Rather, it was 
a petition to the sovereign’s mercy, and a defendant could not avail 
himself of the plea as a matter of right—a court had discretion 
whether the plea should be accepted.129 Thus traditionally the plea 
of nolo contendere was an admission of guilt and not merely a device 
for escape from the legalistic stigma and consequences of admitting 
the commission of a crime. A  court is warranted, in the strict sense, 
in imposing the full criminal penalties assigned by the statute in
1326 TEXAS L 4 W  REVIEW  [Vol. 45; 1301
Co. v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); U nited States v. Standard U ltra­
m arine and Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil 
Co., 26 F. Supp. 336 (D. Minn. 1939), aff’d, 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert, denied 314 U.S. 
644 (1941).
126 Note, supra  note 74, a t 686.
127 E.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F.2d 412 (7th 
Cir. 1963), rertfg in part 211 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. 111. 1962).
128 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F.2d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 
1963). If  all criminal antitrust cases were contested, the A ntitrust Division either would 
need a substantial budget increase o r would be forced to curtail the scope of its activities 
drastically.
129 See generally 2 W. H a w k in s ,  A T r e a t i s e  o n  P l e a s  t o  t h e  C r o w n  466 (8th ed. 
1824); Lenvin & Meyers, Nolo Contendere: Its  Nature and Implications, 51 Y a l e  L.J. 1255 
(1942); Comment, Nolo Pleas, 8 D e  P a u l  L. R e v . 68 (1958); Note, Nolo Contendere—Its 
XJse and Effect, 52 C a l i f .  L. R e v . 408 (1964). T here are only two major limitations on the 
availability of the plea. Nowhere may i t  be used in a capital case, and in  some jurisdic­
tions i t  is unavailable in  a felony case. Lenvin & Meyers, supra a t' 1258. This latter lim ita­
tion is im portant in those states whose criminal antitrust statutes create felonies and 
which lim it the availability of nolo pleas to cases of m inor misdemeanors, e.g., State v. 
Kiewel, 166 Minn. 302, 207 N.W. 646 (1926); Williams v. State, 130 Miss. 827, 94 So. 882 
(1923); Roach v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 954, 162 S.E. 50 (1932), and in  those states which 
will not accept the plea in  felony cases, e.g., Schad v. McNinch, 103 W. Va. 44, 136 SJE. 865 
(1927); Brozosky v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 222 N.W. 311 (1928).
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question after a plea of nolo contendere.130 T he only major limitation 
upon the power of the court to impose a penalty is the court’s judicial 
discretion exercised in the light of the facts pled to activate sovereign 
mercy.
T he troublesome question with regard to nolo pleas and their 
effect on criminal sanctions in antitrust enforcement is whether courts 
should accept the plea in the first instance, rather than whether the 
courts may assess the maximum criminal sanction once the plea has 
been accepted. Acceptance of a nolo plea dulls the effectiveness of 
antitrust sanctions in general both because private litigants are de­
prived of a prima facie case under section 5(a) of the Clayton Act and 
because the court is less likely to assess maximum criminal penalties 
in the absence of full litigation of all the facts and circumstances sur­
rounding the violation.131 In addition, it is logical to assume that the 
defendant and his acquaintances are less likely to believe that he has 
been convicted for the commission of a criminal act since it is easy 
to rationalize the nolo plea as a settlement of questionable liability for 
the best interest of all concerned. Consequently, the fu ll stigma of 
being convicted of a serious crime is lost and the deterrent effect of 
the criminal sanction is watered down considerably.132
Although the Antitrust Division has usually resisted acceptance 
of nolo pleas, the courts have been exceedingly liberal in accepting the 
plea in criminal prosecutions under the antitrust laws, relying on the 
policy of the proviso to section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, the public 
interest in expediting litigation and easing crowded dockets, and the 
facts and circumstances of individual cases.133 Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes courts to accept nolo pleas, 
but judicial discretion under Rule 11 should be exercised in light 
of the policy supporting criminal antitrust sanctions and the policy 
behind section 5(a) of the Clayton Act.134 Relying on the proviso to 
section 5(a) several courts have held that defendants have the right 
to capitulate without trial in antitrust cases.135 A  basic difficulty with
130 See, e.g., Hudson v . United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926); U nited States v. McDon­
ough, 1959 T rade Cas. 69,482 (S.D. Ohio).
131 See U nited States v. Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288, 289 n .l (S.D. Cal. 1954) where the 
A ntitrust Division stated its opposition to ready acceptance of nolo pleas by the courts 
and asserted: “Uncontrolled use of the plea has led to shockingly low sentences and in ­
significant fines which are no deterrent to crime.”
132 Id.. See also Note, supra note 101, a t 848-57.
133 Note, supra note 101, a t 860-61.
134 Note, supra note 101, a t 862.
135 E.g., United States v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 203 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Wis. 
1962) (consent decree w ith an “asphalt clause” rejected); U nited States v. W ard Baking 
Co., 1963 T rade Cas. 70,608 (N.D. Fla.), vacated and remanded, 376 U.S. 327 (1964)
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this position is that section 5(a) was not intended to confer any rights 
on antitrust defendants but was primarily intended to benefit third 
parties injured by an antitrust violation.136 The proviso to that section 
was intended to facilitate enforcement of the Act by encouraging de­
fendants to capitulate.137 It is indeed anomalous, therefore, for a court 
to hold that a defendant has a right to plead nolo contendere in a 
criminal antitrust case or that a court in its exercise of discretion 
under Rule 11 can ignore objections by the Government to the ac­
ceptance of the plea. If the Government objects to a nolo plea in a 
particular case, the court should not overrule the Government’s de­
cision not to avail itself of the benefits Congress intended to bestow 
upon the prosecution, except perhaps where there is a clear showing 
of abuse by the Government in objecting to the plea. This position 
would conform with the congressional purpose in establishing crim­
inal sanctions for use in antitrust enforcement, for it would increase 
the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions; at the same time, it would 
fulfill the basic purpose of section 5(a) of the Clayton Act by aiding 
private treble damage claimants.
At the state level, the actual use of nolo pleas in antitrust en­
forcement is difficult to measure in light of the general absence of 
state criminal prosecutions. N o state statute makes specific reference 
to the availability of the plea.138 T he use of consent decrees in civil 
actions and forfeiture cases, however, indicates a willingness to emu­
late federal practice and therefore make use of the plea.
It is recommended that the states follow the practice of allowing 
nolo contendere pleas in state-initiated criminal antitrust cases to the 
extent that they expedite state antitrust enforcement. One of the
(consent decree entered w ithout Government consent); U nited States v. B.F. Goodrich 
Co., 1957 Trade Cas. 68,713 (D. Colo.).
lse 51 Cong. R ec. 1962, 1964 (1914) (President Wilson’s statement to Congress in  sup­
port of the passage of § 5 of the Clayton Act); see Note, supra note 101.
137 See 51 Cong. R ec. 15,824 (1914) (remarks of Senator Lewis); 51 Cong. R ec. 16,276 
(1914) (remarks of Senator Webb); 51 Cong. R ec. 16,004 (1914) (remarks of Senator Chil­
ton); H .R . Rep. No. 627, p t. 2, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
138 Tennessee’s antitrust law refers expressly to the availability of consent decrees 
in  actions against cooperative marketing associations restraining or monopolizing trade, 
T en n . Code A nn. § 69-111 (1955), and W ashington’s antitrust law, which has no criminal 
sanctions, refers to the availability of “assurance of discontinuance.” W a sh . R ev. Code 
A nn. § 19.86.100 (Supp. 1966). In  some states it  has been held that the plea of nolo con­
tendere is not available a t all, either on the theory it  is no t w ithin the criminal code 
of the state and is therefore excluded by implication. People v. Miller, 264 111. 148, 106 
N.E. 191 (1914); Mahoney v. State, 197 Ind. 335, 149 N.E. 444 (1925); State v. H ill, 145 
Kan. 27, 64 PSd 71 (1937); State v. Kiewel, 166 M inn. 302, 207 N.W. 646 (1926). Contra, 
McPab v. State, 42 Wyo. 396, 295 P. 278 (1931). In  other states a statute has abolished the 
plea expressly. See, e.g., People v. Dailboch, 265 N.Y. 125, 191 N.E. 859 (1934). T hus a t the 
state level no generalizations about the availability of nolo pleas are possible.
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major hurdles facing any state antitrust enforcement program is a lack 
of funds, and because nolo pleas may mitigate operational expenses 
for state antitrust enforcement, they should be sanctioned and en­
couraged, though wholesale use of the plea should be carefully guarded 
against, since the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions may become 
diluted. Since the primary effect of the plea is to allow defendants to 
avoid the cost and embarrassment of defending a criminal action and 
yet protect themselves from the collateral estoppel effect a statute may 
give other pleas in private damage actions, many defendants will need 
no inducement to plead nolo. However, both state and federal judges 
should consider the following factors in deciding whether to accept the 
plea or in determining the punishment to be assessed after the plea 
is accepted:139 (1) the gravity of the offense; (2) the effect of the ac­
ceptance of the plea on private litigants; (3) the character of the offense; 
(4) the recidivism of the defendant; (5) the cost of uncovering and in­
vestigating the offense; (6) the culpability of the individual defendants; 
(7) the impact of the offense upon affected individuals and the com­
munity; and (8) the need for instilling respect for and adherence to 
antitrust policy through the stigma of a litigated conviction of the anti­
trust laws.
IV. P r o p o s a l s  C o n c e r n in g  C r i m i n a l  Sa n c t io n s  i n  
A n t it r u s t  L e g is l a t io n
T he central premise of those who advocate the use of criminal 
sanctions to enforce compliance with antitrust policy is that criminal 
sanctions act as a deterrent.140 As is true elsewhere in criminal law, 
the difficulty with the deterrence theory is lack of proof that jail 
sentences, fines, and the stigma of being labeled a criminal do coerce 
compliance with the antitrust laws. T he only concrete evidence avail­
able on the question concerns those who are not deterred by criminal 
sanctions and are apprehended.141
But the alternatives to criminal sanctions as a method of enforce­
ment offer little comfort. Injunctions can only operate in fu turo  and
139 These factors have been among those considered by federal judges when con­
sidering nolo pleas in  federal criminal antitrust cases. United States v. Safeway Stores, 
Inc., 20 F.R.D. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1957); cases cited note 48 supra.
140 See generally E. Sutherland, supra note 2; Bell & Friedman, The Use o f Criminal 
Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A  Sociological View, 17 S ta n . L. 
Rev. 197 (1965). T he Report of the Attorney General’s Committee also indorsed the use 
of criminal sanctions in cases of clear-cut violations. A t t 'y  G en . N a t ’l  C om m . A n t i t r u s t  
R e p . 343-53 (1955).
141 Cf. note 104 supra and accompanying text.
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may well be viewed by those subject to antitrust regulation as a nui­
sance or as only one of the many risks of doing business. T he deterrent 
value of an injunction is, therefore, very slight.
Trebling damages on behalf of private litigants may well seem 
a useful alternative deterrent to criminal sanctions. However, most 
treble damage suits are spawned by Government-initiated suits and 
most private litigants rely heavily upon Government investigation and 
prosecution to prove their cases.142 T he success of privately initiated 
suits has not been impressive,143 and the sting of private treble damages 
as a deterrent has been substantially mitigated by a revenue ruling hold­
ing that treble damages are deductible from income as an ordinary and 
necessary business expense.144 Consequently, whatever deterrent effect 
may be attributable to treble damage actions is largely lost by their tax 
deductibility and also by the unproven likelihood that a corporation 
can pass the cost of damages on to consumers in the form of higher 
prices, to employees in the form of lower wages, or to stockholders in  
the form of lower dividends.
Yet some courts have considered treble damage suits a severe 
penalty, and a danger may be presented by suits promoted by lawyers 
specializing in such claims.145 Moreover, the suggestion that the Gov-
142 Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 A n t i ­
t r u s t  B u l l .  5 (1959). I t  is particularly rare for private litigants to explore new fields o£ 
antitrust. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 
219 (1948); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
143 W hile the ratio  o£ private to Government suits is impressive, see A dm in . O f f ic e  
o f  t h e  U.S. C o u r ts  A n n . R e p . 95 (1957), most o£ the private suits were begun after Govern­
m ent litigation revealed the violation. Hearings on the Role o f Private Antitrust Enforce* 
m ent in Protecting Small Business Before a Subcomm. of the Select Senate Comm, on 
Small Business, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1958); Comment, A ntitrust Enforcement by 
Private Parties: Analysis. of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 Y a le  L.J. 1010, 
1060 (1952). B u t see Comment, Consent Decrees and the Private Action: A n A ntitrust 
Dilemma, 53 C a l i f .  L. R e v . 627, 628 n.7 (1965). Moreover, many o£ the private suits were 
terminated short of favorable judicial action for the plaintiff. W hile it  is impossible to 
determine how many private cases were favorably settled £or plaintiffs, surveys of litigated 
cases uniformly show that plaintiffs seldom prevail. E.g., Bicks, supra note 142, a t 8, 11; 
Comment, Proof Requirements in A nti-Trust Suits: The Obstacles to Treble Damage 
Recovery, 18 U. C h i. L. R e v . 130, 138 (1950); Note, supra note 26, a t 290; Comment, A n ti­
trust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage 
Suit, 61 Y a le  L.J. 1010 (1952). I t  has been estimated that settlements are reached in  ap ­
proximately 25% o£ the cases filed. Bicks, supra note 142, a t 5, 8. In  the vast majority of 
cases where the Covemment obtained a  court decision tha t the antitrust laws were vio­
lated, convicted defendants paid nothing to claimants in  the form of damages or settle­
ments. Note, supra note 26, a t 290.
144 Rev. R ul. 64-224, 1964-2 C um . B u l l .  52. T he implications of this ru ling  are far- 
reaching. I t  may encourage settlement of valid private damage actions while also stiffening 
resistance to nolo contendere pleas and consent decrees. T he risk of a conviction o r a 
litigated finding of civil violation followed by a  private treble damage action is mitigated 
since the prim a facie effect of section 5(a) of the Clayton Act may now mean only a large 
tax deduction rather than a substantial dent in  profits. See generally Note, 113 U. Pa. 
L. R e v . 954 (1965); Barber, W indfall fo r Conspiracy, T h e  N a t io n ,  Nov. 9, 1964, a t 333
145 See Note, supra note 101, a t 868-75.
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em m ent have primary discretion in determining whether nolo pleas 
are to be accepted must be weighed in light of the fact that the Gov­
ernment’s exercise of such discretion will have a direct influence upon 
the number of private treble damage claims brought subsequent to 
the Government case. T he relationship of nolo pleas to section 5(a) 
of the Clayton Act cannot be ignored; but empirical research is lack­
ing on the questions whether treble damage claims are worthwhile 
antitrust remedies or whether Government prosecutions should be 
prima facie evidence in a private treble damage action of a violation 
if  a nolo plea is accepted/46 or if a nolo plea is accepted over objections 
by the Government.147 At this juncture it is recommended that the 
courts not enter nolo pleas if the Government objects to their entry, 
unless the defendant can prove that the Government’s objection has 
no merit whatsoever.148
The tandem use of treble damage claims with criminal sanctions 
should measurably increase the deterrent effect of the criminal sanc­
tion. But the effectiveness of treble damages as a deterrent is limited  
by their tax deductibility and by the possibility that they can be 
passed on to consumers, employees, and shareholders.
T he monetary forfeiture, a sanction common to state antitrust 
statutes149 and one recommended in the Tentative Draft of the Pro­
posed Uniform State Antitrust Law,150 also has several inherent weak­
nesses. T he forfeiture is usually for a set amount and is often computed 
on a per diem basis.151 Aside from failing to make the punishment fit 
the crime, per diem monetary forfeitures can result in astronomical 
penalties.152 A  forfeiture is labeled as civil, but in fact is penal. Its
146 See S. 2512, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
147 See H .R. 8253, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
148 Abuse of such a power by the Government will be tempered by manpower and 
budget lim itations restricting the Government’s ability to  litigate and by judicial review.
149 See App. B, infra.
150 Tentative D raft of Uniform State A ntitrust Act W ith  Prefatory Notes and Com­
ments, § 11 in  4 T ra d e  Reg. Rep. 30,101 (1967). Others have also included the civil 
forfeiture as a sanction in  their recommendations. E.g., Stem, supra note 35, a t 742-43. 
Professor R ahl’s proposal does no t include civil forfeitures. See Rahl, supra note 35, a t 
779-81.
151 See, e.g., O hio  R ev. Code A nn. § 1331.04 (1962).
152 See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 131 Miss. 343, 95 So. 137, cert, denied, 263 
U.S. 573 (1923) (forfeitures of §8,055,075); Standard Oil Co. v. State, 132 S.W.2d 612 
(Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1939, w rit dism’d jdgm t corr.) (forfeiture of §450,000); Waters- 
Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 106 S.W. 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908), aff'd, 212 U.S. 86 (1909) (for­
feitures of license to do business in  state and §1,623,900). A more recent Texas case re­
sulted in  a forfeiture of §125,000. See 130 J8NA A n ti t r u s t  & T ra d e  Reg. Rep., a t A5-A6 
(1964). T he Tentative D raft of the Proposed Uniform State A ntitrust Act, supra note 150 
avoids this problem by establishing maximums of up  to  §5,000 forfeiture for individuals 
violating the statute and up to §25,000 forfeiture for corporations, associations, firms, and 
partnerships violating the statute.
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purpose is not to compensate the injured sovereign or to disgorge 
ill-gotten gain, but to penalize antisocial conduct. W hile litigation has 
not yet revealed whether the courts will continue to hold that civil 
standards of proof, civil procedures,153 and the state’s right to appeal 
from adverse lower court decisions in forfeiture cases pertain,154 a 
trend does seem to be developing toward treating monetary and prop­
erty forfeitures as criminal sanctions.155 Consequently, a state that 
relies on civil forfeitures to enforce its antitrust laws may find it has 
a sanction with all the enforcement difficulties of a criminal law but 
without the deterrent value of the stigma that attaches upon a criminal 
conviction.
Forfeitures also have the disability of being treated as a cost of 
doing business. W hile it is unlikely that a civil forfeiture for antitrust 
violations w ill fall within the revenue ruling labeling treble damages 
as ordinary and necessary business expenses,156 the danger exists that a 
civil forfeiture can be passed on in the form of higher market prices 
and that corporate officials who may be assessed a civil forfeiture may 
be entitled to indemnification. T he deterrent effect of a civil forfeiture 
is, therefore, open to serious question.
Other sanctions could be suggested as antitrust remedies with a 
deterrent value. For example, since the criminal fine has little deter­
rent value when applied against the corporation because it can be 
passed on to the consumer, it is usually, insignificant in comparison to 
corporate worth and profit, and receives relatively little publicity; a 
sanction should strike at more vital corporate interests. A  corporation 
might be required to indude in its advertising campaigns the fact that 
it has violated the antitrust laws by price fixing,157 or it might be refused
153 See U nited States v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1943); Berge, Remedies Available 
to the Government Under the Sherman Act, 7 L a w  & C o n tem p . P ro b . 104, 111 (1940).
154 Stern, supra note 35, at 744; Tentative Draft, Uniform State Antitrust Law, supra 
note 150, at 23-24.
155 Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. State, 154 Tex. 573, 280 S.W.2d 723 (1955); cf. One 1958 
Plym outh Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
150 See note 144 supra. T hree categories have been developed by the courts for deter­
m ining whether disbursements are business expenses: (1) reparational payments sufficiently 
connected w ith the taxpayer’s business, Ditmars v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 481, 485 (2d 
Cir. 1962); (2) payments made in the norm al course of an illegal enterprise, Commissioner 
v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958); Commissioner v. Doyle, 231 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1956); and 
(3) fines or penalties assessed for illegal busines activity, T ank T ruck Rentals v. Commis­
sioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). Disbursements falling within the first two categories are de­
ductible as “ordinary and necessary” business expenses. W hile courts have reached con­
flicting results w ith regard to the th ird  category, it  seems clear that monetary forfeitures 
are punitive and to allow a tax deduction would underm ine the public policy of state 
antitrust legislation. See T ank Truck Rentals v. Sullivan, supra.
157 Regulation of advertising is not unusual for purposes of health or safety o r to 
prevent fraud. See, e.g., Wool Products Labeling Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 68 (1964); Fur 
Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 69 (1964); Textile Fiber Products Identification Act,
15 U.S.C. § 70 (1964).
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permission to bid on Government contracts or partake of other forms 
of Government largesse.158 Corporate officers, managers, and directors 
responsible for corporate antitrust violations might be penalized by 
ouster from office, much in the same manner that the Landrum-Griffin 
Act penalizes union officials with a criminal record.159
W hile the mere mention of these sanctions may terrify many 
corporate executives, they are at best too controversial to be politically 
feasible. Even so, penalties like these, which would jeopardize a cor­
poration’s share of the market or its market reputation and would 
threaten managerial careers within the offending corporation, would 
seem to be the best deterrents, for they strike closest to the factors 
that drive corporations and their executives to violate the antitrust 
laws.
T he remaining alternative is the criminal sanction. -And at least 
at the federal level, this alternative is likely to remain with antitrust 
enforcement for a substantial period of time.160 T he deterrent value 
of criminal penalties for violation of the antitrust laws is generally 
admitted by most commentators.161 Moreover, when premised upon
158 Blacklisting of convicted corporations has often been suggested. See Note, supra 
note 26, a t 289 n.35. T his particular remedy, however, may prove worse than the disease. 
For example, if all the corporations involved in  the electrical equipm ent cases were black­
listed, the Government would have no domestic sources for purchasing its requirements 
of heavy electrical equipment, worsening the balance of payments to the possible detri­
m ent of national security. T he granting or w ithholding of government franchises, monop­
olies, and rights, a sanction already in widespread use, can be a much greater and more 
effective sanction than criminal penalties. See Reich, The New Property, 73 Y a le  L.J. 733 
(1964). T he corporate charter itself is a  government privilege, perm itting investors to carry 
on business in  an artificial form so as to lim it liability and acquire sufficient assets in  a 
manageable form. Since the corporate charter is a privilege granted by the government, 
the charter-granting state may reserve the right to revoke the charter for abuse of the 
privilege. M any state antitrust statutes have reserved this right. See App. B, infra.
159 29 U-S.C. § 504 (Supp. 1965); see U nited States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) 
(holding this section unconstitutional as a bill of attainder, b u t not forbidding a require­
m ent that persons committing certain acts not hold union office); cf. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1964) 
(prohibiting corporate officers and directors engaged in  flotation, underwriting, public 
sale, o r distribution of stocks and bonds from serving as officers, directors, o r employees 
of member banks in  the Federal Reserve System), upheld  in  Board of Governors v. Agnew, 
329 U.S. 441 (1947). Judge Wyzanski issued an interesting decree in  United States v. Grin- 
nell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), rev'd as to decree, 348 U.S. 565 (1965): after 
divesting three affiliate corporations of the Grinnell Corporation to remedy monopoliza­
tion of the automatic flre and burglar alarm business, he enjoined the affiliates from em­
ploying the president of Grinnell who for 15 years had been the leader of the illegal 
course of conduct.
_ 160 T he increase in  criminal cases during the past few years, see App. A, Table II, 
infra; W hiting, supra note 111, the increase of criminal fines from §5,000 to §50,000, and 
the general endorsement of criminal penalties by the Attorney General’s National Com­
mittee, see A t t ’y  G en . N a t ’l  C om m . A n t i t r u s t  R e p . 349-53 (1955), suggest a strengthening 
of public policy in  favor of criminal sanctions for antitrust violations.
161 See generally, e.g., A t t ’y  G en . N a t ’l  Com m . A n t i t r u s t  R e p . (1955); E. S u th e r ­
l a n d ,  supra note 2; Bell & Friedman, supra note 140; Radish, supra note 3; Comment, 
supra note 3; Note, Trend Toward Increasing A ntitrust Sanctions, 37 In d . L.J. 502 (1962); 
Note, supra note 26. T he angnish that may be found in  the writings of the representatives 
of business interests demonstrates the deterrent value of criminal penalties. See, e.g., 
Cahill, supra note 1; Hazard, supra note 1.
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the facts that the bulk of antitrust prohibitions are not vague, that 
antitrust violations are contrary to the prevailing mores of American 
society, and that antitrust violations have a serious economic impact 
upon the economy and the consumer, criminal sanctions are not only 
necessary to insure compliance, but are also proper sanctions.
T he deterrent value of short jail sentences in especially aggra­
vated cases would seem appropriate. T he threat of serving a jail 
sentence should be extremely offensive to the class of individuals who 
normally violate antitrust policy. In view of the continuation of 
predatory antitrust violations by otherwise praiseworthy individuals 
in our society, it would seem that the drastic step of imprisoning vio­
lators from time to time is essential to coerce compliance.162
Those considerations applicable to the advisability of invoking 
jail sentences as a sanction for the enforcement o f antitrust policies are 
also applicable to the advisability of invoking criminal fines for anti­
trust violations. W hile not as drastic as imprisonment and not serving 
the same ends as imprisonment, the criminal fine does have the same 
basic purpose of deterrence. Where imprisonment deters through fear 
and removal from society, criminal fines deter by the threat of being 
labeled a criminal and by making the violation less profitable. This 
latter effect is important because a criminal fine may prevent the po­
tential violator from committing the crime if the chances of detection 
and loss of illegal gain outweigh the profits that would be gained by 
a successful violation of the statute.163 If the criminal fine is high 
enough in relation to the expected illegal gain, the risk of loss may 
not warrant a gamble against the odds of detection, regardless of 
stigma, possible treble damage actions and the other values inherent 
in the criminal law as a means of social control. If the profit motive 
is the driving force behind private enterprise164 and the psychological
162 See generally P re sid e n t’s Comm’n  on  L aw  E n fo rce m e n t a n d  A d m in is tra tio n  o f  
Ju s tice , supra n o te  45, a t  102-12.
163 i t  was on this theory th a t the criminal fines under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(1964), and the New York antitrust act, N.Y. G e n . B u s. L a w  § 341 (McKinney 1962), were 
recently raised to  $50,000. Other proposals have included increasing Sherman Act fines 
up to §500,000. See Note, supra note 161, a t 511-15. Some believe th a t the size of present 
fines may make the risk of detection one worth taking. See Note, supra note 26.
164 T he  extent to which this is true may be questioned. T he institutionalizing of 
management, see W . W h y t e ,  T h e  O r g a n i z a t i o n  M a n  (1956), the separation of ownership 
of the corporation from control of the corporation, see A. B e r l e ,  P o w e r  W i t h o u t  P r o p ­
e r t y  (1959); P .  H a r b r e c h t  & A. B e r l e ,  T o w a r d  t h e  P a r a p r o p r i e t a l  S o c ie ty  (1960), and 
the drive for security w ithin highly competitive markets, see, e.g., Smith, supra note 89, 
may well have chipped away the relative importance of the profit motive as a primary 
factor in  antitrust violations. I t  does seem that many of today’s antitrust violations are 
reflections of the drive for status and financial security tha t arise ou t of a strong competi­
tive market, ra ther than prim arily symptoms of greed and profit motive gone ram pant. 
I t  seems to this w riter th a t many per se violations arise ou t of a drive for security, while
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cause of most antitrust violations, the deterrent value of a criminal 
fine, provided the fine is adequate, seems far greater than that of a 
seldom-invoked prison sentence.
A  factor eroding the effectiveness of the criminal fine against 
corporate officers, directors, and agents, despite the increase in  the 
amount of the criminal fine and the holding of U n ited  States v. W ise,105 
is the doctrine of indemnification.160 Many states grant corporations 
the power to indemnify corporate officers or give corporate officers the 
right to receive indemnification for engaging in litigation which bene­
fits the corporation.167 In a few instances, particularly where a corpo­
rate official has pleaded nolo contendere to a criminal antitrust indict­
ment, courts have upheld the power of the corporation to indemnify 
the officers of the corporation,108 and in one case the right of the cor­
porate official to demand indemnification.169 .
Indemnification of corporate officials who violate the antitrust 
laws weakens the effectiveness of the fine as a criminal sanction, 
whether the conviction is based upon a nolo plea or upon full litiga­
tion on the merits. If, of course, a defendant successfully defends a 
criminal action brought against him in his representative capacity, 
indemnification might well be permissible where the adjudication of 
nonliability is equivalent to an adjudication that the corporation is 
not guilty of antitrust violations.170 But where the negative finding
many of the monopolization and merger violations are caused by an excess of profit
motive.
Studies should be made of the motives of antitrust violators so tha t deterrent rem ­
edies could be developed w ith more accuracy. Criminal sanctions, forfeitures of illegal 
gain, deprivation of the righ t to hold corporate office, charter forfeitures, and monetary 
penalties should all be examined w ith a view toward making the deterrent fit the viola­
tion, assuming, of course, tha t deterrence is the proper method for social control of the 
presumed evils of anticompetitive conduct.
165 370 U.S. 405 (1962); see notes 114-16 supra and  accompanying text.
160 See generally Bishop, Current Status of Corporate Director's R igh t to Indem ni­
fication, 69 H a rv .  L. R e v . 1057 (1956); Washington, Litigation Expenses for Corporate 
Directors in Stockholders’ Suits, 40 C o lu m . L. R e v . 431 (1940); Comment, Corporations— 
Indemnification of Management for Litigation Expenses, 52 M ic h . L . R e v . 1023 (1954); 
Note, Indemnification of the Corporate Official for Fines and Expenses Resulting from  
Criminal Antitrust Litigation, 50 G eo . L.J. 566 (1962).
167 E.g., A la s k a  S t a t .  § 10.05.009(15) (1962); C a l .  C o rp . C ode §§ 830, 834(b) (West
1955); C o lo .  R e v . S t a t .  A n n . § 31-2-1(15) (1963); C o n n . G en . S t a t .  R e v . § 33-454 (1961); 
D e l .  C o d e  A n n . tit. 8, § 122(10) (1953).
168 Koster v. W arren, 297 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1961); Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.
179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff’d, 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589
(1944).
169 Schwartz v. General Analine & Film Corp., 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.2d 533 (1953). 
T he court held th a t N.Y. G en . C o rp . L a w  § 64 (McKinney Supp. 1961) did not apply in 
criminal actions. New York enacted a broader indemnification statute to cover fines, costs 
and attorneys’ fees in  1963. N.Y. Bus. C o rp . L a w  § 723 (McKinney 1963).
170 See Schwartz v. General Analine & Film Corp. 305 N.Y. 395, 410, 113 N.E.2d 533, 
540 (1953) (Field, J., dissenting).
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of not guilty is not equivalent to an affirmative finding of nonliability 
on the part of the corporation, indemnification at least for the fine 
assessed should be denied.171
A  distinction might be drawn between indemnification for fines 
assessed and the costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in defending a crim­
inal antitrust case even if  the defense is unsuccessful. W hile indemni­
fication for a fine assessed would undermine the deterrent effect of the 
criminal sanction, an absolute prohibition upon indemnification for 
costs and attorneys’ fees where a defense is unsuccessful might deter 
corporate officers and directors from asserting meritorious defenses 
because of the great expense they will incur in defending a typical 
antitrust case. It would seem reasonable to allow a corporation leeway 
to indemnify for costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees if the director, 
officer or employee acted in good faith and had no reasonable cause 
to believe his conduct was unlawful.172 On the other hand, any in­
demnification of a corporate officer for fines, costs, or attorneys’ fees 
should be subject to judicial review at the instance of dissenting share­
holders to insure that sympathetic directors and officers or responsible 
directors or officers who have escaped prosecution do not subvert the 
deterrent purpose of the criminal fine with corporate funds.
171 See generally Note, Indemnification of the Corporate Official for Fines and E x­
penses Resulting from  Criminal Antitrust Litigation, 50 G eo . L.J. 566 (1962).
172 T he New York indemnification statute goes beyond indemnification of costs and 
attorneys’ fees and permits indemnification for fines paid under similar circumstances:
(a) A corporation may indemnify any person, made, o r threatened to be made, 
a party to an action or proceeding other than one by or in  the right of the cor­
poration to procure a judgm ent in  its favor, whether civil o r criminal, including 
an action by or in the right of any other corporation of any type or kind, 
domestic o r foreign, which any director or officer of the corporation served in 
any capacity a t the request of the corporation, by reason of the fact tha t he, his 
testator o r intestate, was a director or officer of the corporation, o r served such 
other corporation in  any capacity, against judgments, fines, amounts paid in 
settlement and reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees actually and neces­
sarily incurred as a result of such action or proceeding, or any appeal therein, 
if such director or officer acted, in good faith, for a purpose which he reasonably 
believed to be in  the best interests of the corporation and, in criminal actions or 
proceedings, in  addition, had no reasonable cause to believe tha t his conduct 
was unlawful.
(b) T he termination of any such civil or criminal action or proceeding by judg­
ment, settlement, conviction or upon a plea of nolo contendere, or its equivalent, 
shall no t in  itself create a presumption that any such director o r officer did not 
act, in  good faith, for a purpose which he reasonably believed to be in  the best 
interests of the corporation or th a t he had reasonable cause to believe that his 
conduct was unlawful.
N.Y. G en . C o rp . L a w  § 723 (1963). Perm itting indemnification for fines seems virtually 
impossible under the standard set ou t by the statute. I f  government antitrust criminal 
prosecutions are lim ited to per se cases and if guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it is difficult to believe tha t a convicted officer could have had "no reasonable 
cause to believe th a t his conduct was unlawful.” Even where the fine is assessed after a 
nolo plea, it seems unlikely tha t an officer could reasonably argue that he had no cause 
to believe his conduct was unlawful if the violation is in  the per se category.
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Since indemnification is governed by state law, state legislatures 
should carefully consider antitrust policy when enacting broad indem­
nification statutes. Considerable thought should be given to revising 
state indemnification statutes, particularly as they are applied to in­
demnification for costs, attorneys’ fees, and fines incurred for convic­
tion of white collar crimes.173 T he recently enacted New York 
indemnification statute174 is a step toward clarifying an otherwise 
unclear area of corporate law.
In summary, it is recommended that federal antitrust regulation 
be enforced primarily by criminal sanctions. Admittedly such a pro­
posal is contrary to the general trend in criminal law away from the 
philosophy of deterrence and toward the policy of rehabilitation. Since 
it is difficult to find any rehabilitative purpose in jailing the normal 
antitrust violator, it is apparent that criminal punishment can serve 
only as a deterrent. T he fact that the ordinary defendant may be of 
high social standing only reinforces this belief, since the pressure of 
deterrence because of a threat of criminal penalties should increase in  
direct proportion to the increase of the social standing and reputation 
of the individual in society.
But in so doing, federal enforcement officials should lim it crim­
inal enforcement to per se violations and only those other types of 
antitrust violations which are predatory or willful, or which amount 
to economic racketeering.175 Federal criminal antitrust enforcement 
should also strive to prosecute corporate directors, officers, and agents 
responsible for corporate antitrust violations that are considered 
criminal violations, since the uneven enforcement of the past has re­
sulted in small business bearing the brunt of criminal enforcement; 
the sanction of a fine against the corporation alone is of questionable 
deterrent value, and disregard for the law is heightened if those re­
sponsible for the conduct of the fictitious corporate entity are able to 
escape punishment for crimes they have used the entity to commit.
Federal enforcement should retain the sanction of jail sentences
173 See generally 28 U. P i t t .  L. R e v . 114 (1966).
174 N.Y. G en . C o rp . L a w  § 723 (1963); see note 172 supra.
173 See A t t ’y  G en . N a t ’i. Com m . A n t i t r u s t  R e p . (1955). Per se violations include 
(1) price fixing, see, e.g., U nited States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940); 
U nited States v. T renton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); (2) group boycotts, see, e.g., 
K lor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators’ Guild 
v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); (3) tying arrangements, see, e.g., N orthern Pac. Ry. v. U nited 
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); (4) 
horizontal division of markets, see, e.g., T im kin Roller Bearing Co. v. U nited States, 341 
U.S. 593 (1951); U nited States v. N ational Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); U nited States v. 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), and perhaps 
vertical division of markets, see, e.g., W hite Motor Co. v. U nited States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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for use in the particularly flagrant antitrust violation. W hile the stigma 
attached to being branded a criminal and being subjected to finger­
printing, photographing, bail, and the other normal steps of the crim­
inal process may be the actual sanctions in cases where fines are 
assessed,176 the threat of being sent to jail is perhaps the strongest 
deterrent to antisocial conduct that any member of the middle or 
upper classes of our society can conceive. Although seldom invoked, 
the specter of imprisonment should provide some deterrence to even 
the most rugged of individualists.
• State antitrust statutes need considerable revision in the area of 
criminal sanctions, and uniform state antitrust legislation should 
be enacted. Many state antitrust statutes contain excessive criminal 
sanctions,177 others lack adequate investigative procedures,178 and-still 
others lack a provision giving a criminal conviction prim a facie effect 
in private actions,179 thereby losing the advantages of nolo contendere 
pleas as enforcement devices furthering efficient administration.
, ' T he case for criminal sanctions in state antitrust statutes is even 
stronger than is the case with federal antitrust legislation. Because 
local violations are usually clear-cut per se violations by small business 
entities,180 the task of-assessing individual responsibility is less diffi­
cult and the deterrent afforded by criminal sanctions more effective. 
T his characteristic of state enforcement suggests that uniform legisla­
tion  should lim it criminal sanctions to per se violations and violations 
that are predatory, willful, or amount to economic racketeering.181
• 176 I t  is, in  fact, the criminal indictment, ra ther than its event in  pecuniary 
penalty o r prison sentence which looms largest in  the minds of executives. N o 
respectable citizen wishes to have his name attainted by a formal charge of 
' crime. None relishes the discomfort, the routine, the anxiety of the process of 
, arraignment; none wishes to be finger printed in  the m anner accorded to the 
ordinary criminal. T hus the stigma of indictm ent tends to be the real punish­
ment. T he actual penalty comes a t the beginning, ra th e r than  the end, of the 
trial. T he  effect is to punish by presumption and no t by proof. T he accused is 
branded w ith the hypothesis of guilt, which in  the office, a t the dub , on the 
golf links he must rebu t as best he can.
W. H a m ilto n  & I. T i l l ,  supra note 3, a t 80. T he same, of course, may be said for anyone 
charged w ith a serious crime, be he a “respectable citizen” o r otherwise. See also W. 
H a m ilto n  & I. T i l l ,  supra note 3, a t 80-81; E. S u th e r la n d , supra note 2, a t 43-45; JBerge, 
supra note 3, a t 470; W hiting, supra note 3, a t 338-40.
177 See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 34.
178 See, e.g., C o lo . Rev. S ta t .  A nn . § 55-4-1 to  -9 (1963); F la .  S ta t .  A nn. § 542.01-.12
(1963); I I I .  R ev. S ta t .  ch. 121 i/z, § 302 (1964).
179 See, e.g., C a l. Bus. & P ro f .  Code § 16750 (Deering 1960); N.Y. Gen. Bus. L aw  
§ 340 (McKinney 1963).
180 See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
181 T he new Illinois antitrust law imposes criminal sanctions only for willful per se 
violations. I I I .  A nn. S ta t .  ch. 38, §§ 60-1 to -11 (Supp. 1966). Section 11 o£ the Tentative 
D raft of a  Uniform State A ntitrust Act, 4 T ra d e  Reg. R ep. 30,101 (1967) is deficient in  
this Tespect because i t  relies on a complicated formula o£ monetary forfeitures for deter­
rence.
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T o  avoid the misuse of the criminal process in grand jury proceed­
ings,182 a uniform state antitrust law should also contain a civil investiga­
tive demand procedure equivalent to that found at the federal level.183 
Otherwise, criminal antitrust enforcement may be prostituted for the 
purpose of investigation in preparation for civil proceedings, rather 
than prosecution of violations as criminal activity.
T o  assist private litigants and add stimulation for nolo con­
tendere pleas in clear-cut cases of violations, a provision comparable to 
section 5(a) of the Clayton Act,184 making judgments or decrees other 
than consent decrees prima facie evidence in subsequent damage suits, 
should be included in any proposal for uniform legislation.185 Such a 
provision should expressly define “consent decrees” to include nolo 
contendere pleas and to exclude guilty pleas.188 A properly drafted 
provision of this type would increase the bargaining power of enforce­
ment officials at the pleading stage of a criminal proceeding.187
T o  assist in making fines and jail sentences more meaningful 
deterrents and to avoid the problem that arose in U n ited  States v . 
W ise ,188 a section comparable to section 14 of the Clayton Act189 and 
a broad prohibition against corporate indemnification, either as a mat­
ter of right or as a matter of corporate power, for fines incurred by 
directors, officers, or agents convicted of violating state or federal anti­
trust laws should be included in uniform legislation. T he former 
provision would increase the deterrent value of the criminal sanction 
substantially and would facilitate the state’s effort to impose liability  
on those responsible for a corporation’s antisocial conduct, for it 
would impose individual criminal liability on corporate officers, di­
rectors, and agents for actual conduct in violation of the antitrust laws
182  See A t t ’y  G e n . N a t ’l  Com m . A n t i t r u s t  R e p . 345 (1955); cf. U nited States v. 
Proctor & Gamble C o., 356 U.S. 677 (1958) (holding it  an  abuse o£ process to use a grand 
jury  in  antitrust investigations where there is no intention to bring  a criminal case).
183 See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
18415 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
185 Section 17 o£ the Tentative D raft of a Uniform State A ntitrust Act so provides: 
"A final judgm ent or decree, other than a  consent decree, rendered in  any proceeding 
under [civil forfeiture and injunction sections of the Proposed Act], shall be prim a fade 
evidence in  any proceeding under [private damage action section] as to all matters w ith 
respect to which the judgm ent o r decree would be an  estoppel between the parties to the 
suit." 4 T r a d e  R e g . R e p . 30,101 (1967).
188 Cf. notes 125-28 supra and  accompanying text. T he Proposed Uniform Act does 
no t define the words “consent decrees.”
187 in  the electrical equipm ent cases an im portant factor in  the court's acceptance of 
nolo pleas in many of the cases was the willingness of defendants in  the most flagrant 
cases to plead guilty. T he  risk involved was conviction on all counts and wider liability 
under section 5(a) of the Clayton Act. See W atkins, supra note 30, a t 98-99.
188 370 U.S. 405 (1962); see notes 114-16 supra and accompanying text,
189 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1964); see text accompanying note 114 supra.
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and would establish a corporate officer’s liability under state law when 
acting in a representative capacity. T he latter suggestion should also 
increase the deterrent value of the criminal sanction, both federal and 
state, since it would force the individuals responsible for corporate 
criminal violations to bear the full cost of any fine that is assessed. 
They would be unable to shift the cost of the fine to the corporation, 
which in turn could make the consumer pay the cost by higher prices, 
make labor forego otherwise justified pay increases, or make the inno­
cent stockholder bear the burden in the form of decreased dividends. 
Some leeway should be provided, however, for indemnification of 
attorneys’ fees and costs where the officer acts in good faith.190
T he seriousness and predatory character of many local restraints 
of trade191 justify the imposition of criminal penalties of up to one 
year in jail and a fine of up to fifty thousand dollars in a state anti­
trust statute.192 If adequate maximums are established, state courts 
will have sufficient discretion to tailor the penalty to fit the crime.
W ith the continued use of criminal sanctions in  federal antitrust 
cases to be expected and the possibility of increased state antitrust 
enforcement activity, the probability of double prosecutions presents 
a serious danger in the minds of some commentators.193 Since state and 
federal antitrust jurisdiction does overlap194 and thirty-two state anti­
trust laws provide for prison sentences for varying types of antitrust 
violations,195 the possibility of double prosecutions is undeniable. This 
possibility is enhanced by the Supreme Court decisions holding that a 
federal and state criminal prosecution of the same individual for the 
same act does not violate the double jeopardy prohibition of the 
federal constitution.196 •
W hile the possibility of double prosecutions is very real, the
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190 See n o tes 170-74 supra a n d  acco m p an y in g  te x t.
191 See note 99 supra.
192 T his proposal would correspond with the penalties available under the federal 
antitrust laws and the Donnely Act, the New York antitrust statute, N.Y. G en . Bus. L a w  
§ 341 (McKinney 1964 Supp.).
193 D illo n , B ut the Other Referee Said!—A Criticism of M ultiple Litigation in Iden­
tical Bidding and Merger Cases, 39 T e x a s  L . R e v . 782 (1961); Jeffers, State and Federal 
Antitrust Actions Against Employer-XJnion Conspiracies: T he Double Dosage Doctrine,
39 T e x a s  L . R e v . 811 (1961).
194 Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 429, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1950); State v. South­
east Tex. Chap. N a tl Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 358 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tex­
arkana 1962, no writ), cert, denied, 372 U.S. 969 (1963); State v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 
9 Wis. 2d 290, 101 N.W.2d 133 (1960); cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Puerto 
Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937). See generally J . F ly n n ,  supra note 35, at 213-16.
195 App. B, infra.
196 Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (conviction by a state court not a  bar 
to subsequent federal prosecution); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (federal prose­
cution not a bar to subsequent state prosecution).
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probability of double prosecutions for antitrust violations is not.197 
Aside from a reasonable expectation that enforcement officials will not 
engage in such a practice198 and the fact that few actual cases of double 
prosecution have ever been reported, state enforcement officials may 
be expected to exercise great caution in this area, since state antitrust 
statutes would run a serious risk of preemption if double prosecutions 
became prevalent.199 Moreover, state antitrust enforcement programs, 
where they do exist, are undermanned and understaffed, a condition 
that prevents the insidious luxury of duplicating federal prosecutions 
and indulging in unfair practices. W ith the passage of uniform state 
antitrust legislation and the development of a high degree of coopera­
tion between federal and state enforcement officials and among state 
enforcement officials,200 the danger of wasteful, unnecessary, and unfair 
double prosecution should be de m inim is.201
107 Very few actual cases of “double jeopardy” arise, and it  is not strange that those 
w riting in  the field usually have few cases to illustrate their thesis. See, e.g., Dillon, supra 
note 193; Jeffers, supra note 193. A proposal to the Committee on State A ntitrust Laws 
of the A ntitrust Section of the American Bar Association urging federal legislation to 
draw a clear statutory line between federal and state antitrust jurisdiction was defeated.
20 ABA Antitrust Section 8 (1962). T he bases for objection to the proposal included: 
(1) the lack of any evidence demonstrating a need for the legislation; (2) the invitation 
to delay prosecutions by jurisdictional motions created by such legislation; and (3) the 
possibility of creating a no m an’s land of regulation similar to tha t in  labor law.
198 J . F ly n n , supra note 35, a t 156.
199 One of the factors weighed in  preem ption cases is the danger of double prosecu­
tions. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); J . F ly n n , supra note 35, at 
152-57. T he closest case of double prosecution in  antitrust regulation recently occurred 
in  a Texas bid rigging case. T he federal government began a criminal action against the 
defendants, United States v. Southeast Tex. Chap. N at’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, Crim. 
No. 13,706 (S.D. Tex., Jan. 11, 1960) (Dep’t of Justice Case No. 1492), and the state brought 
a civil action against the same defendants for an injunction and monetary forfeitures. 
State v. Southeast Texas Chap. N at’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 358 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. 
App.—Texarkana 1962, no writ), cert, denied, 372 U.S. 969 (1963). T he  federal case was 
dismissed after the defendants paid a forfeiture of 5125,000 in  the state action. See 130 
BNA A n t i t r u s t  & T ra d e  Reg. Rep. A5-A6 (1964).
200 j .  F ly n n , supra note 35, a t 227-52.
201 Another method for heading off double prosecutions m ight be the inclusion of a 
section similar to that in  the Illinois A ntitrust Act, which bars the state attorney general 
from bringing prosecutions under the state act when a federal civil or criminal case is 
pending against the same defendant for the same conduct. I I I .  A nn. S ta t .  ch. 38, § 60-6(3) 
(Supp. 1966). W hile such a provision would protect antitrust defendants from double 
prosecutions caused by subsequent state proceedings, it  would not seem to prevent the 
federal government from initiating criminal proceedings against a defendant for the same 
conduct after state proceedings have been commenced. In  the absence of a statutory safe­
guard, the courts should take a  more realistic attitude toward double jeopardy or apply 
ad hoc preemption in cases of double prosecution. Cf. State v. Texaco, Inc., 14 Wis. 2d 
625, 111 N.Wi2d 918 (1961) where the Wisconsin Supreme Court by dictum suggests the 
la tter course. See also J .  F ly n n , supra note 35, a t 157.
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APPENDIX A: DISPOSITION OF CASES B R O U G H T  
BY T H E  D EPAR TM EN T OF JUSTICE1
TABLE I: 1890-1959
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Cases 
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T A B L E  II: 1950-1959
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Cases 
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N um ber o f  
Cases 
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1 Source: T h e  F e d e ra l  A n t i t r u s t  Law s w ith  Sum m ary o f  Cases In s t i tu te d  by  t h e  
U.S. 1890-1951 (CCH 1952); id., 1952-1956 Supplem ent (CCH 1957); N ew  U.S. A n t i tr u s t  
Cases (CCH T rad e  Reg. R ep . T ran sfe r  B in d er 1957-1961); 5 T ra d e  R eg. R ep. 45,003-59 
(1967). As o£ Septem ber 20, 1967, no final disposition has been  rep o rted  fo r eleven cases. 
Seven civil cases (Dep’t  of Justice  Case Nos. 1018, 1019, 1187, 1267, 1301, 1306, 1483) and 
th ree  crim inal cases (Case Nos. 1221, 1223, 1316) are  pending. In  Case No. 1151 th e  de­
fendants w ere found  gu ilty  o f a  v io la tion  of th e  Sherm an Act, b u t  no  rem edy has been 
assessed. T h is  append ix  has been  p repared  w ith o u t reference to  these eleven cases.
A  deta iled  breakdow n of th e  in form ation  from  w hich these tables w ere prepared , 
includ ing  a  lis t o f th e  cases fitting  in  each of th e  categories, is on  file in  th e  offices of 
th e  Texas Law Review.
2 All cases in  which the Government won its case against one or more defendants and 
was granted some form of relief.
3 All cases dismissed on substantive or procedural grounds, acquittals, etc.
4 M andatory and prohibitory injunctions, divestiture, dissolution, or divorcement. In  
no government suits were damages awarded or forfeitures imposed.
6 Includes prison sentences, suspended sentences, and probation.
‘ Percen t o f to ta l n u m b er o f cases.
t  Percent of civil cases pursued to remedy.
t  Percent of criminal cases pursued to remedy.
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Ala. Code None T it. 14, § 62; 
T it. 57,
T it. 14, § 62 None T it. 9, § 22 T it. 7, §124
§§ 107-8
Alaska Comp.
L aws A n n . None None None Supp. 2, None None
Ariz. R ev. Stat. §36-2A-156
A n n . None §§ 44-1404B, §§ 44-1404B, § 44-1402; § 44-1401B § 44-1405B
-1408 -1408 Ariz. Const, 
art. 14, § 15
A rk . Stat. § 70-108 § 70-102 None § 70-103 None None
Calif. Bus. &
Prof. Code None § 16755 None § 16752 § 16722 § 16750
Colo. R ev. Stat.
A n n . § S3-4, -5 § 55-4-7 §55-4-7 None §55-4-6 § 55-4-8.
Co n n . G e n . Sta t .
Rev. None §53-310 § 53-310 None None None
F la . Stat . None §§ 542.05, .09 §542.05 §§ 542.02 to .04 § 542.10 None




H a w a ii  Rev. L aw s Sec. IV
(Supp. 1963) §§ 205A-6(4), 
-H(l)(b), 
-13
§ 205A-14(1) §205A-14(1) None § 205A-10 §§ 205-ll(l)(a) to 
-12
mention the remedy specifically even though the remedy may be available by judicial interpretation or under l Z e  other
Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and West Virginia do not appear in th if  table because they have no general antitrust statutes. r r  ui-muac mey nave










Revocation of Contracts and
Injunctive Fines and Prison License to Defense of DamagesRelief Forfeitures Sentences Do Business Unclean H ands
Idaho Code A nn. §48-112 §§ 48-101, -103, §§48-101, § 48-107; None §48-114
-108; 
Idaho Const.
-108 Idaho Const, 
art. 11, §18
art. 11, §18
§ 60-7(2)I I I .  R ev. Stat. §§60-7(1), § 60-6 §60-6 None None
ch. 38 §§ 60-1 to -7(2)
-11 (Supp. 1966) 





I owa Code §551.9 §§ 551.4, §§551.4, §§551.8, .9, §§ 551.5, § 553.12
553.3,555.13 553.3, .13, 553.6, .7 553.4, .5
719.1, .2
Kan, Gen. Stat. § 50-105 §§ 50-105, -106, §§50-105, §§ 50-103, §§50-101, §§50-108,115
Ann. -114,16-112 -106, -114, to  -105 -107,-117
16-112
§ 51.137La. R ev. Stat. §§ 13.5088, §§ 51.122, .123, §§51.122, §§ 12.212, None
51.128, .129; .126, .130 .123, .126 51.130, .139;
La. Const, art. La. Const, art.
19, § 14 19, § 14 .
§ 10-1105Me . R ev. Stat. None §§ 10-1101,-1105 §§ 10-1101, None None
A nn. ch. 137 -1105, -1106 §10Mass. Gen . Laws §3 §§ 1 ,9 ,9A , 13 §§ 1 ,9 ,9A, §11 §2
ch. 93 10,13
§§ 28.38, .55M ich . Stat. Ann. N one §§ 28.35, .348, §§ 28.348, §§ 28.32, .33, ' §§ 28.31, .349,
.350, .826 .350, .826 .351, .352, .36, .61, .62




























Minn. Stat. Ann. § 623.02, .03 § 623.01, .19(2) § 623.01, 
.19(2)
§ 623.02 None None
Miss. Code Ann. §1088 §§ 1088,1091 None §§ 1097,1132 §§ 1093,1096 §1092
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 416.260 §§ 416.050, 
.070 to .080





Mont. R ev. Codes 
Ann.
§94-1108 §§ 94-1101,-1109; 






Neb. R ev. Stat. §§ 59-810,-813, 
-814,-819




§§ 59-809, -810, 
-813
§ 59-801 § 59-821
N.H. R ev. Stat. None § 356.4 § 356.4 None § 356.2 None
A n n .
N.M. Stat. Ann. None §§49-1-1,-2 §§49-1-1,-2 None § 49-1-3 § 49-1-3
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Gen. Bus. Law Gen. Bus. Law Gen. Bus. Law None Gen. Bus. Law Gen. Bus. Law
Law 
N.Y. Pen. Code
§342 §§ 341,342-a; 
Pen. Code § 581a
§341;
Pen. Code §§ 580(5), 
581-a
§340 § 340(5)
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-14 §§75-1,-6,-8 §§ 75-1,-6, -8 None §75-1 § 75-16
N.D. Cent. Code §51-08-11 §§ 51-08-03, 
-04, -13
§ 51-08-04 §51-08-05; 
N.D. Const, 
art. 7, § 146
§ 51-08-07; 
N.D. Const, 
art. 7, § 146
§51-08-08
Ohio R ev. Code § 1331.11 §§ 1331.03, .99 § 1331.99 §§ 1331.07, .11 §S 1331.01,-06 8 1331.08
A n n .
Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 79, §§21,22 T it. 79, §§21,22, 
27
T it. 79, § 27 T it. 79, §§ 21-26 T it. 15, § 217; 































S.C. Code Ann. None §§66-65, -68 None §§66-52, -66,67; 
S.C, Const, art. 
9, §13
§ 66-51 § 66-53




art. 17, § 20
§ 37.1913 None
T enn. Code Ann. None § 69-103 § 69-103 § 69-104 §§69-101,-102,-108
§ 69-106
T ex. R ev. Civ. Rev. Civ. Stat. Rev. Civ. Stat. Pen. Code arts. Rev. Civ. Stat. Rev. Civ. Stat. None
Stat. Ann. 
T ex. Pen. Code 
Ann.
art. 7436a art. 7436a 1635,1637-40 arts. 7430-32 arts. 7429, 
7437
§ 50-1-10U tah Code Ann. None §§50-1-4,-5 § 50-1-5 §§ 50-1-7, -9 
U tah Const, 
art. 12, § 20
§ 50-1-6
Vt. Stat. Ann. 
T it. 11
§551 None None §551 None None
Va. Code Ann. §§59-32,-33 §59-29 § 59-29 § 59-23 §59-22 § 59-26
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 19.86.080, .090 § 19.86.140 None § 19.86.150 
Wash. Const, 




W is. Stat. § 133.02 § 133.01 § 133.01 §§ 133.21 to .23, 
.245
§ 133.26 § 133.01
W yo. Stat. Ann. None §§ 40-21, -40 §§40-21,-40 §§40-19,-20 None None
